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Crane:

CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Daniel A. Crane†

In early 2022, the new leadership of the Justice Department’s (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division
made waves by announcing that the DOJ would consider bringing criminal cases for
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This dramatic change in policy—Section 2
has not been criminally enforced in decades—was first announced in a speech in March by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Powers,1 asserted again a month later in another
speech by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter,2 and then confirmed in an updated
Antitrust Division Manual released in April.3
If the point was to get the attention of the defense bar and the companies they represent,
these bombshell announcements succeeded. Defense-oriented law firms rushed to release a slew
of client alerts, warning of a “significant departure from modern DOJ criminal antitrust
enforcement policy,”4 and a “surprising”5 and “significant policy shift”6 with “far-reaching”
implications.7 And, although the Justice Department has not yet identified possible targets, it is
no secret that the Biden Administration has ongoing monopolization cases against Google and
Facebook, has investigations open as to other Big Tech companies as well, and generally takes
† Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Many thanks to Shay Elbaum and the
research team at the University of Michigan Law Library for copiously pulling together the database of cases from
which this Article’s findings are drawn. Wesley Ward provided excellent research assistance.
1
Head of DOJ Criminal Antitrust Unit Says that Criminal Monopolization Cases May be on the Horizon,
https://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/head-of-doj-criminal-antitrust-unit-says-thatcriminal-monopolization-cases-may-be-on-the-horizon
2
Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter Delivers Opening Remarks at 2022 Spring Enforcers Summit,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-jonathan-kanter-delivers-opening-remarks-2022spring-enforcers.
3
Justice Department Antitrust Division Manual (April 2022), § 7-2.200 (“[The Justice Department] may also
bring, and has brought, criminal charges under Section 2.”); compare Antitrust Division Manual (Fifth ed. 2017) §
III C .1 (“In general, current Division policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and prosecution in cases
involving horizontal, per se unlawful agreements, such as price fixing, bid rigging, and customer territorial
allocations.”).
4
Sydney Cooper, et al, Monopolists Going “Directly to Jail?” DOJ Announces Intent to Criminally Prosecute
Section 2 Violations, https://www.jdsupra.com/authors/rob-manoso/.
5
Antitrust Division Announces Newfound Intent to Pursue Monopolization Cases Criminally,
https://www.bakerlaw.com/Antitrust-Division-Announces-Newfound-Intent-to-Pursue-Monopolization-CasesCriminally.
6
Powers’ Statement Represents a Significant Antitrust Division Policy Shift,
https://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/head-of-doj-criminal-antitrust-unit-says-thatcriminal-monopolization-cases-may-be-on-the-horizon.
7
DOJ Signals Intent to Bring Criminal Charges for Monopolization, https://www.mcguirewoods.com/clientresources/Alerts/2022/3/doj-signals-intent-to-bring-criminal-charges-for-monopolization
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the position that Section 2 has been dramatically underenforced and that a reckoning is due.8
Whatever the Administration’s plans, and whatever the policy considerations of bringing
criminal monopolization cases, it is clear that historical precedent will play a considerable role
in arguments for and against a renewed regime of criminal enforcement. In response to assertions
that criminal Section 2 enforcement would constitute a dramatic break with precedent, the
Administration answers that criminal monopolization enforcement was once standard practice
and that the last several decades of non-enforcement are the aberration. In a June 7, 2022 speech,
Deputy AAG Powers defended the possibility of bringing criminal monopolization cases as “not
a novel idea or theory” but one that represents a revival of previous agency practice.9 He added:
“Historically, the antitrust division did not shy away from bringing criminal monopolization
charges when companies and executives committed flagrant offenses intended to monopolize
markets . . . and by our count, the Justice Department has brought over 100 criminal
monopolization cases.”10
So what exactly is the historical record on criminal Section 2 enforcement? Surprisingly,
there is no source authoritatively compiling the record. In contrast to Mr. Powers’s assertion of
over 100 cases, a study in 2002 reported 87 criminal monopolization cases, without providing
any significant detail about them.11 Estimates of when the last criminal monopolization case
was brought have varied, with one scholar asserting that “[t]he last major criminal
monopolization case the federal government brought was against American Tobacco in 1940,”12
and other scholars estimating that the last criminal monopolization case (major or not) was
brought in 1967, 1969, or 197213 In fact, the Justice Department brought a criminal
monopolization case as recently as 1977.14 According to a study by Richard Posner, the only
criminal monopolization jail sentences were between 1925 and 1929.15 As will be shown, that
also is not quite accurate or complete.
This Article aims to provide a comprehensive account of the Justice Department’s
historical record on criminal Section 2 enforcement. Based on a review of every Justice
Department enforcement action reported in CCH’s Trade Regulation Reporter, I have assembled
a table of 175 criminal monopolization cases, with the first (against Federal Salt) brought in 1903
and the last (against Braniff Airlines) brought in 1977. That table appears as an appendix to this
Article.
The raw numbers are not the most important headline. A far more significant question is
what sort of criminal monopolization cases the Justice Department historically brought. In
8

See Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, July 9, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promotingcompetition-in-the-american-economy/
9
Michael Acton, U.S. DOJ’s Exploration of Criminal Charges for Monopoly Breachs Follows Decades of
Underenforcement, mLex June 7, 2022.
10
Id.
11
Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 80 Or. L. Rev.
109 (2002) (“To construct the database of monopolization cases, I assembled all the relevant cases from the CCH
Abstracts from 1890 to 1996. Of the more than 4,000 entries, I found 423 cases for which sufficient information
was available and that met the initial criteria--a consent decree or a finding against the defendants in a
monopolization case brought by the government. Of the 423 monopolization cases, eighty-seven were criminal
cases and 336 were civil cases. All eighty-seven criminal cases resulted in monetary fines.”).
12
Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 Antitrust L. J. 127, 147 (2009).
13
Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 George Mason L. Rev. 833, 882
n.331 (2011); Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 Chi. K. L. Rev. 207. 216 n.
48 (2003).
14
See supra n. xxx.
15
Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 391 (1970).
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particular, were these criminal conspiracy cases of the type that today would still be charged
criminally, but only under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, or were these cases involving unilateral
exclusionary conduct—cases of the type that the Justice Department has rarely brought even
civilly in recent decades (but of which there are hundreds of private cases)?16 The answer to this
question is significant because the Justice Department’s announcement of criminal
monopolization charges seems to be aimed at unilateral monopolization offenses rather than as
a mere supplement to its anti-cartel Section 1 criminal enforcement. Claims that criminal
monopolization enforcement is historically grounded in agency practice thus turn primarily on
the Department’s historical practice with respect to unilateral conduct offenses—a topic on
which there is scant academic work.
My findings can be summarized briefly as follows: Out of 175 cases in which the Justice
Department brought a criminal charge under Section 2, only 20 involved unilateral conduct. In
8 of these cases, the criminal charges were dismissed as to all defendants or all of the defendants
were found not guilty. In the remaining 12 cases, the defendants were found guilty, usually via
a nolo contendere plea, and a fine was imposed. The largest fine--$187,000—was imposed on
Safeway Stores in 1955 and would be equivalent to about $3 million today. In three cases, a
prison sentence was imposed. Two of those cases—United Pacific (1933) and Barrett (1939)
involved crimes of violence. In one curious outlier case in 1973, an individual apparently served
one month of prison time for unilateral monopolization not involving violence.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I establishes the parameters of the
research question, in particular the distinction between hard core antitrust offenses and those
analyzed under the rule of reason, as bearing historically on the question of criminal
enforcement. Part II presents my empirical findings based on my review of the CCH database
and supplementary sources. Part III considers the historical record’s implications for the Justice
Department’s ambition to revive criminal Section 2 enforcement.
I.

RESEARCH QUESTION

A. Distinguishing Hard Core and Rule of Reason Violations of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act is simultaneously a civil and criminal statute. Textually, it is a felony to
violate Section 1 by entering into any “contract combination or conspiracy . . . in restraint of
trade” or Section to by “monopoliz[ing], conspire[ing] to monopolize, or attempt[ing] to
monopolize.”17 But, historically, the vast majority of antitrust enforcement has been civil—
whether suits by the Justice Department or state Attorneys General in equity, private lawsuits for
treble damages, or civil enforcement of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by the
FTC (which has no criminal powers). The question is not whether the Justice Department has
the legal power to bring criminal cases for any particular violations of the Sherman Act—it
does—but whether it should do so in its prosecutorial discretion.
Two fundamental distinctions in antitrust doctrine are important to understanding the
prosecutorial decision. The first is between concerted and unilateral action. By its terms, Section
16

During the eight years of the Bush Administration, the Justice Department brought no monopolization cases
(even civil ones) at all. During the eight years of the Obama Administration, the Justice Department brought only
one such case. Jad Chamseddine, Obama no more aggressive than Bush on mega-mergers, 2016 CQNERAPPT
0354 (“Almost eight years into his presidency, Obama's Justice Department has brought just one
minor monopolization case, suing a small Texas hospital — United Regional Health Care System of Wichita Falls
— for using its dominant market position to hurt competitors.”).
17
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
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1 of the Sherman Act requires concerted action—some sort of agreement.18 In contrast, purely
unilateral conduct is covered by Section 2. However, Section 2 also prohibits conspiracy to
monopolize, and so Section 2 covers much ground that Section 1 covers as well.
The second fundamental distinction is between “hard core” behavior governed by a rule of
per se illegality where the mere form of the agreement makes it unlawful, and other behavior
whose anticompetitive properties are more ambiguous and therefore require analysis under a
searching inquiry into market definition, market power, anticompetitive effects, and
procompetitive justifications.19
In contemporary doctrinal terms, the only “hard core” offenses meriting per se
condemnation are those involving “naked” horizontal agreements among competitors such as
price fixing or market division cartel agreements.20 Any other type of agreements—for example
joint ventures among competitors and vertical agreements—are governed by the rule of reason.21
Hence, unilateral monopolization behavior actionable under Section 2 is generally governed by
the rule of reason and requires proof of market power in a properly defined relevant market,
anticompetitive effects, and consideration of offsetting efficiency justifications.22
Courts sometimes assume that all of Section 2 is governed by rule of reason analysis, but
that is not quite true. A naked horizontal conspiracy to monopolize would be actionable as per
se illegal under Section 1 and there would be no good reason to apply a different standard to the
same behavior under Section 2. There is very little recent case law on this topic because there is
no obvious reason to bring a separate Section 2 conspiracy to monopolize case if the same
behavior is per se illegal under Section 1, apart from the possibility of a sentencing enhancement
in a criminal case.23
A further important distinction concerns the overlap between collusion and exclusion. Many
cartel agreements also involve agreements to exclude rivals. One of the best known criminal
monopolization cases—American Tobacco—involved both a price fixing conspiracy and a
conspiracy to exclude competitors.24 A study by Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow found
that thirty-six percent of cartels engage in strategic activities designed to exclude entry.25 Much
of the per se illegal behavior charged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act also involves
exclusionary behavior that could be charged under Section 2. Thus, for example, an agreement
among competitors to engage in predatory pricing would be per se illegal as collusion even
though unilateral predatory pricing is adjudicated under the rule of reason.26 A 1994 study by
Joseph Gallo and co-authors found that 2 percent, or a total of 33, of the 1,522 criminal antitrust
cases brought by the Justice Department between 1955 and 1993 involved exclusionary

18

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
See Ohio v. American Express Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283-84 (2018).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See, e.g.,, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
23
In American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1946), the Supreme Court held that separate Section 1
and Section 2 liability may be found for the same conduct because the two claims require separate proof.
24
American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 788 (1946) (“In the present cases, the court below has found that
there was more than sufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy in restraint of trade by price fixing and other
means, and also a conspiracy to monopolize trade with the power and intent to exclude actual and potential
competitors from at least a part of the tobacco industry.”).
25
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, 54
J. L. Econ. 455, 472 (2011).
26
USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 972 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds,
495 U.S. 328 (1990).
19
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practices.27 However, my own review suggests that few cases in that set involved unilateral
behavior that would be judged under the rule of reason or, to put it the other way, that most of
them must have involved per se unlawful collusive agreements to engage in exclusionary
behavior.
The Supreme Court has held that there is no bar to prosecuting antitrust violations criminally
under the rule of reason.28 As discussed next, the Justice Department has long shied away from
doing so.
B. The Justice Department’s Evolving Policy Toward Criminal Antitrust Enforcement
The Justice Department’s policy on criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act has evolved
over the decades since 1890. As an entry point to this history, it is useful to begin with a speech
given in 1978 by Assistant Attorney General Donald Baker that presented a retrospective on the
Justice Department’s understanding of its own history on criminal antitrust enforcement.29
Baker’s speech came at a significant moment for purposes of this Article’s analysis. Although
Baker’s focus was criminal Section 1 rather than Section 2 cases, it coincided with the Justice
Department’s abandonment of criminal monopolization cases—the last one ever having
occurred the year before Baker’s speech. It is also significant that Baker worked for the Carter
Administration and was not particularly reflecting Chicago School influences, which were only
beginning to be exerted in the courts.
According to Baker, “[o]riginally, the Department of Justice viewed the [Sherman Act] as
essentially civil and, except in a handful of labor cases involving violence, used section obtain
equitable relief.”30 Thus, from 1890 to 1903, the Justice Department brought sixteen civil cases
and seven criminal cases under Section 1.31 Fifty years later, the “Sherman Act assumed a new
role” under Thurman Arnold’s leadership at the Antitrust Division.32 Arnold believed that “[a]s
a deterrent, criminal prosecution is the only effective instrument under existing statutes” and that
the civil suit should only be a supplement, not a substitute, for criminal enforcement.33 Thus,
between 1938 and 1943, the Antitrust Division brought 340 section 1 cases, 231 of which were
criminal prosecutions.34 Some of these involved “old-fashioned price fixing conspiracies,” but
others “raised novel issues.”35 According to Baker, Arnold “clearly went beyond present
standards of due process” and [h]is actions invited criticism that businesses were branded as
criminal on the basis of uncertain conduct and unpredictable rules.”36 Hence, in 1955 the
Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws recommended that criminal
cases only be brought “where the law is clear and the facts reveal a flagrant offense and plain
27

Joseph C. Gallo et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study of Law and Economics, 16 RES. IN
L. & ECON. 25, 28 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed., 1994).
28
U.S. v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1978).
29
Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not To Indict, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1978); see also Remarks by John H.
Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, "Antitrust Enforcement to Preserve the Competitive
Market Place," Cleveland, Ohio,
April 18, 1979.
30
Baker, supra n. xxx at 410.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. (citing Thurman Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5, 6
(1940)).
34
Baker, supra n. xxx at 410.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 411.
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intent unreasonably to restrain trade.”37 In a statement submitted to the Committee, the Justice
Department “drew the line somewhere between” Arnold’s view and the Committee’s, stating
that in general criminal prosecutions should be limited to: “(1) price fixing; (2) other violations
of the Sherman Act where there is proof of a specific intent to restrain trade or to monopolize;
(3) a less easily defined category of cases which might generally be described as involving proof
of use of predatory practices (boycotts, for example) to accomplish the objective of the
combination or conspiracy; (4) the fact that a defendant has previously been convicted of or
adjudged to have been violating the antitrust laws may warrant indictment for a second
offense.”38
According to Baker, the question of criminal enforcement was less important in the decades
following the Attorney General’s report because the Antitrust Division brought relatively few
criminal cases.39 In 1967, the Justice Department issued new guidance on its criminal
enforcement intentions in antitrust cases, stating that it would typically only bring a criminal
prosecution in one of two cases: (1) where “the rules of law alleged to have been violated are
clear and established—describing per se offenses—” typically price fixing; or (2) “if the acts of
the defendants show intentional violations—if through circumstantial evidence or direct
testimony it appears that the defendants knew they were violating the law or were acting with
flagrant disregard for the legality of their conduct.”40 Baker described this position as “fair and
useful today” and reflecting current agency practice.41
A year after Baker’s speech, the first edition of the Antitrust Division Manual made no
mention of bringing criminal monopolization cases and assumed that criminal cases would be
brought under Section 1.42 Consistently with Baker’s speech, it articulated the guidelines for
bringing a criminal case as follows:
Because the Sherman Act is both a civil and a criminal statute, the Division
historically has proceeded by criminal investigation and prosecution in two types
of cases: (1) cases involving per se antitrust violations; for example, price fixing,
bid rigging, and horizontal customer and territorial allocations; and (2) cases
where there is evidence that the defendants knew that they were violating the law
and acted with flagrant disregard for the legality of their conduct. There are a
number of situations, however, where, although the conduct may appear to be a
per se violation of law, criminal investigations or prosecution may not be
considered appropriate. These situations involve areas where: (1) there is
confusion in the law; (2) there are truly novel issues of law or fact presented; (3)
there is confusion caused by past prosecutorial decisions; or (4) there is clear
evidence that the subjects of the investigation were not aware of, or did not
appreciate, the consequences of their action.43

37

Id. (citing Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 349 (1955)).
Id. (citing Report of Attorney General, supra n. xxx at 350, citing statement of Stanley N. Barnes, Ass’t Att’y
Gen. of Charge of Antitrust Div.).
39
Id. at 412.
40
Id. (citing The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
Crime and Its Impact—An Assessemtn I10 (1967)).
41
Id.
42
Id at IV-82 (“A significant portion of Antitrust Division cases that go to trial are cases brought as criminal
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”)
43
Antitrust Division Manual (1979) at III-11.
38
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The language from the 1979 edition was repeated in Second Edition in 1987.44 A year later,
Assistant Attorney General Rick Rule outlined his views about criminal enforcement of Section
2.45 In his view, “because unilateral conduct alleged to be illegal monopolization is generally not
clearly anticompetitive, it has rarely been a target of criminal prosecution.”46 However, “a
criminal monopolization case would be warranted in some circumstances,” such as conspiracies
among competitors involving “some obviously and irrefutably harmful conduct to keep out
interlopers,--for example, blowing up their plants,” where both Section 1 and Section 2 counts
might be brought, or unilateral cases involving conduct involving threatened or actual violence.47
However, Rule did not “believe criminal prosecution would be appropriate if the alleged
exclusionary conduct was nonviolent, commercial conduct such as pricing or investment.”48
Subsequent editions of the Antitrust Division Manual made even more explicit that
criminal enforcement was reserved for Section 1 cases. In 1998, the Third Edition issued by the
Clinton Administration largely repeated the 1979 language, but began with the caveat: “On its
face, Section 1 of the Sherman Act … makes any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade a criminal offense,”49 thus suggesting again that criminal enforcement should be
confined to Section 1 cases. In 2008, the Fourth Edition stated: “In general, current Division
policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and prosecution in cases involving horizontal, per
se unlawful agreements such as price fixing, bid rigging, and customer and territorial
allocations.”50 The same language was repeated by the Obama Administration in the Fifth
Edition (2014).51
In consequence, from the first edition of the Handbook until the previously noted change
in the 2022 Sixth Edition, the antitrust violations criminally prosecuted were principally naked
horizontal agreements charged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This remains a robust area
of criminal enforcement, with scores of individual defendants sentenced to prison sentences
averaging 15-20 months and corporate fines reaching the hundreds of millions.52 The Justice
Department also brought some criminal challenges against practices that were considered per se
illegal at the time, but would now be governed under the rule of reason. For example, in 1978,
the Justice Department indicted Cuisinarts for resale price maintenance,53 a practice that was per
se illegal at that time but has since become subject to the rule of reason54 and is virtually not
challenged even in private civil cases.55

44

Antitrust Division Manual (1987) at III-12.
60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, 57 Antitrust L. J. 257, 265-66
(1988).
46
Id. at 265.
47
Id. at 265-66.
48
Id. at 266.
49
Antitrust Division Manual (1998) at III-16.
50
Antitrust Division Manual (2008) at III-20.
51
Antitrust Division Manual (2014) at III-12.
52
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Enforcement Trends Charts, https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcementfine-and-jail-charts.
53
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1009-10 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd, 665 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1981).
54
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
55
John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anticompetitive Impacts of
Minumum-Advertised-Price Restrictions, 63 J. L. & Econ. 113, 117 (2020) (observing that, post-Leegin, RPM
cases have failed to gain traction).
45
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C. How To Understand the Historical Record on Criminal Monopolization Cases
That the Justice Department has enforced only Section 1, and not Section 2, criminally
since the late 1970s sets the stage for analyzing the Department’s prior historical record. In
particular, it raises the question of whether the scores of criminal Section 2 cases previously
brought were essentially criminal conspiracy cases charging the same types of hard-core cartel
behavior that today would only be charged under Section 1, or whether they included cases of
purely unilateral conduct, or to put it in Rick Rule’s words, of “exclusionary . . . nonviolent,
commercial conduct.”56
There is an easy answer to this question, but also a harder one. The easy answer is that, as
discussed in the following Section, almost every one of the 175 cases in which monopolization
was criminally charged asserted conspiracy to monopolize. From this, it would be tempting to
discount the Justice Department’s criminal monopolization cases as simply duplicative of
Section 1 theories and not charging the sorts of unilateral conduct offenses of current interest.
But that would be misguided due to a wrinkle in antitrust law—the Copperweld doctrine—that
arose a few years after the Justice Department stopped bringing criminal monopolization cases.
In Copperweld,57 the Supreme Court held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary are a “single entity” for purposes of antitrust law and hence that intra-firm agreements
are not agreements at all for the concerted action requirement of Section 1. The Copperweld
doctrine has been applied more generally to cover Section 2 conspiracy claims agreements
among agents of the firm and the firm.58 A firm and its officers or employees are legally
incapable of conspiring within one another to commit an antitrust violation. But this was not
always so.
Consider, for example, one of the cases discussed below, the Justice Department’s 1939
criminal monopolization charge against Barrett Company and 12 of its officers. The indictment
alleged a combination and conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate trade and commerce
in sulphate of ammonia, a nitrate fertilizer. The anticompetitive behavior charged was essentially
an intra-firm scheme to corner the market on sulphate of ammonia through exclusive contracts
with large producers. The “conspiracy” charged seems to have been among the officers of firm
and the firm itself. Today, that would not count as a conspiracy at all, since the relevant
agreements occurred within a “single entity.” To code Barrett as a conspiracy case would miss
the fact that, today, Barrett would be considered a unilateral conduct case and could only be
charged under Section 2.
Hence, in categorizing the Justice Department’s historical criminal monopolization cases
as to whether or not they charged unilateral conduct, I did not rely exclusively on whether the
indictment or information charged conspiracy which, as noted, almost all of them did. Instead, I
reviewed the case description of the Justice Department’s allegations and made a qualitative
determination as to whether the conduct charged involved collusive agreement among rival firms
or individuals, or whether instead involved essentially unilateral exclusionary behavior. In a
56

Rule, supra n. xxx.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
58
Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Adelson, 2020 WL 7029148, at * 9 (D. Nev. Nov. 30, 2020); Tonal Renal Care, Inc. v.
Western Nephrology and Metabolic Bone Disease, P.C., 2009 WL 2596493, at *13-14 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2009);
Gucci v. Gucci Shops, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
57
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number of cases, I had to read judicial decisions concerning the case to determine whether the
conduct alleged was concerted or unilateral.59
Of necessity, these categorization decisions involved a degree of judgment. Some cases
involved aspects of concerted action, but the thrust of the case was unilateral, in which case I
coded it as unilateral. The table at this end of this Article contains a description of the allegations
in all of the 175 criminal monopolization cases, and others may reach different conclusions as to
whether a case involved what would today be considered conspiracy or concerted action, or
unilateral conduct. In the following section, I describe my findings, including a detailed
discussion of each of the cases that I categorized as involving unilateral monopolizing behavior.
II. FINDINGS
In order to create a set of all potentially relevant cases, I began by compiling a spreadsheet
of all Justice Department antitrust actions filed in federal court from 1890-1979 reported in the
CCH Trade Regulation Reporter—a total of 2,352 cases.60 (As noted, the FTC does not bring
criminal cases). I next categorized the cases as either civil or criminal. Criminal cases were
initiated mostly by indictment, and in a few instances by information.61 Of the 2,352 cases, 1,059
were criminal--987 initiated by indictment and 72 by information.62 For the criminal cases, I next
ascertained whether a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act was alleged. From about 1940
forward, CCH usually specified the section or sections of the Sherman Act alleged in the
indictment or information, so my coding simply tracked CCH’s designation. For earlier years
(and occasionally in later ones), the CCH record did not spell out the statutory section. I therefore
reviewed the case description to determine whether the charging instrument asserted any of the
substantive offenses covered by Section 2 of the Sherman Act—monopolizing, conspiring to
monopolize, or attempting to monopolize, and coded the case as asserting a Section 2 case if it
did. Where CCH abstracts were ambiguous as to whether a Section 2 theory was alleged, I
searched for other publicly reported information about the case, such as judicial decisions.
Of the 1,059 criminal cases, 175 included monopolization allegations. The earliest case
(Federal Salt) was brought in 1903 and the last (Braniff) in 1977. As shown in Figure 1 below,
the cases were heavily concentrated in the 1940s and 50s.

59
For example, in January of 1943, the Justice Department brought separate criminal Section 1 and Section 2
cases against Kroger Grocery and Baking Company and Safeway Stores in the District of Kansas, charging
conspiracy to restrain competition and monopolize the sale and distribution of food products. Although the two
corporations were charged in separate cases, a district court opinion makes clear that the Justice Department was
charging the two companies with concerted action to monopolize and fix prices. U.S. v. Safeway Stores,
Maryland, 51 F. Supp. 448 (D. Kan. 1943).
60
To confirm that no criminal monopolization cases were brought after 1979, I ran additional searches on the
CCH database for 1980-1996, when CCH stopped printing its case updates. My search located no criminal Section
2 cases filed in this period.
61
In contrast, civil cases were generally initiated by petition or complaint.
62
In a number of instances, the Justice Department filed a civil action concurrently with the criminal challenge.
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Figure 1: Criminal Monopolization Cases by
Decade
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For each case, I next determined whether the charging instrument alleged coordinated
anticompetitive behavior or unilateral exclusionary conduct. The vast majority of the cases
alleged coordinated behavior among or between competitors such as price fixing, market
division, customer allocation, or group boycotts and charged both Section 1 and Section 2. At
least 60 complaints named associations, trade organizations, societies, or unions as defendants
and typically alleged that these organizations served as facilitators of collusive schemes. In many
other cases, the charging instrument alleged anticompetitive agreements or cartel conduct among
competitor companies.
Out of 175 cases in which the Justice Department brought a criminal charge under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 20 involved unilateral conduct. In 8 of these cases, the criminal
charges were dismissed as to all defendants or all of the defendants were found not guilty. (In
one of these 8 cases, the criminal charges were dropped in favor of a consent decree in a related
civil case). In the remaining 12 cases, the defendants were found guilty, usually via a nolo
contendere plea, and a fine was imposed. The largest fine--$187,500—was imposed on Safeway
Stores in 1955. In three cases, a prison sentence was imposed for which time was served. Two
of those cases—United Pacific (1933) and Barrett (1939) involved crimes of violence. In one
curious outlier case, an individual apparently served one month of prison time for unilateral
monopolization not involving violence. In 1973, Missouri magazine wholesaler Allan Molasky
pleaded guilty to attempting to monopolize the wholesale distribution of magazines and
paperback books in the Gulf Coast area by attempting to acquire all of the local wholesale
agencies located in the area between Victoria, Texas and Pensacola, Florida and threatening to
put out of business anyone who refused to sell. He received a sentence of one year, with 11
months suspended (and two years of probation). Mr. Molasky’s exceptional case may have done
the trick, because it was the last time the Justice Department ever charged unilateral
monopolization conduct criminally.
Figure 2 below presents a summary of the 20 cases and, for cases involving a fine, the
amount of the fine in 2022 dollars.63
63

Present value of fines calculated using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator:
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
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Figure 2
Defendant

Year

Outcome
(Guilty: G;
Not Guilty: NG)

Present value of fine
(May 2022)

Winslow
Rockefeller
Nash Bros.
Ludowici-Celadon
Union Pacific
Barrett
Chattanooga News
NY Great A&P
Gamewell
Kansas City Star
National Linen
Safeway Stores
Harte-Hanks
Jas. A. Matthews
General Motors
H.P. Hood
United Fruit
Union Camp
Empire Gas
Molasky

1912
1914
1917
1929
1933
1939
1940
1944
1946
1953
1955
1955
1958
1958
1961
1963
1963
1963
1973
1973

NG
NG
NG
G
G
G
G
G
G
NG
G
G
NG
G
NG
NG
G
G
NG
G

------$85,466
$22,659
$20,879
--$2,939,759
$694,605
--$240,843
$2,052,640
--$492,634
----$38,460
$1,298,025
--$686,141

Total fines

$8,572,111

The following paragraphs summarize the allegations and outcome of each of the 20 cases
I coded as unilateral monopolization offenses:
•

U.S. v. Winslow (D. Mass. 1912). Combination of several shoe machinery companies
through merger into United Shoe and tying arrangements in lease agreements. The
district court sustained demurrers to some counts of the indictment, which the Supreme
Court affirmed in U.S. v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913). The case was subsequently nolle
prossed.

•

U.S. v. Rockefeller (S.D.N.Y 1914). William Rockefeller, railroad company officers, and
directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company named as defendants.
Allegation that defendants conspired to monopolize the transportation facilities of New
England. Disagreement by the jury as to five defendants and six defendants were found
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not guilty; pleas of immunity were sustained as to four defendants, and a nolle prosequi
was entered as to the remaining defendants.
•

U.S. v. Nash Bros. (D.N.D. 1917). Conspiracy to monopolize trade in fruit by seeking to
prevent competitors from purchasing fruit from growers and distributors and by cutting
prices to cause competitors to sustain losses in the sale of any fruit purchased. Demurrer
sustained; case dismissed.

•

U.S. v. Ludowici-Celadon Co. (N.D. Ill. 1929). Conspiracy to monopolize interstate
commerce in the manufacture and sale of roofing tile by the acquisition of the business,
property, and assets of competing corporations, and by various unlawful acts and
agreements to exclude and prevent competition in the sale and installation of roofing tile.
Defendant pleaded nolo contendere and a fine of $5,000 was imposed.

•

U.S. v. Union Pacific Produce Co. (S.D.N.Y 1933). Officers of company also named as
defendants. Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in artichokes by
preventing, through threats, intimidation and violence, artichoke receivers, jobbers,
retailers, push-cart peddlers and others, their customers and employers, from dealing in
artichokes in the metropolitan area of New York except through the company. Guilty
pleas by all defendants, fine of $1000 was imposed on the company and a sentence of six
months' imprisonment was imposed on each of two individual defendants. The sentences
of two other defendants were suspended and those defendants were placed on probation
for a period of five years.

•

U.S. v. Barrett Company (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 12 officers of the company also named as
defendants. Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in artichokes by
preventing, through threats, intimidation and violence, artichoke receivers, jobbers,
retailers, push-cart peddlers and others, their customers and employers, from dealing in
artichokes in the metropolitan area of New York except through the company. Guilty
pleas by all defendants, fine of $1000 was imposed on the company and a sentence of six
months' imprisonment was imposed on each of two individual defendants. The sentences
of two other defendants were suspended and those defendants were placed on probation
for a period of five years.

•

U.S. v. Chattanooga News-Free Press Co. (E.D. Tenn. 1940). Two individuals also
named as defendants. Conspiracy to restrain and an attempt to monopolize interstate
commerce by preventing the operation of competing afternoon newspapers in
Chattanooga, Tennessee. The information further charges that contracts for advertising
space in issues of the Chattanooga News-Free Press required advertisers to use that paper
exclusively for afternoon advertising in Chattanooga. The jury found the defendants
guilty on count one and not guilty on count two of the indictment. A fine of one cent was
imposed on each defendant in lieu of costs.

•

U.S. v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (E.D. Ill. 1944). Defendant
corporation, 11 of its subsidiaries, 16 officers and directors, Business Organization, Inc.,
and public relations counsel also named as defendants. Government alleged that the A &
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P group by virtue of its dominant position in the industry was able to control policies
and practices in the production, processing, manufacturing and distribution, both
wholesale and retail, of food products throughout the United States. Trial of the case
before the court without a jury. The Court found three defendants not guilty and all
remaining defendants guilty on both counts of the information and fines totaling
$175,000 were imposed. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the District
Court judgment of conviction against the defendants, holding that the A & P group had
abused their mass buying and selling power, and that their business practices restrained
trade and tended toward monopoly. The court upheld the liability of the manufacturing
subsidiaries because of their interlocking directorates, and affirmed the conviction of Carl
Byoir and Business Organization, Inc. because of their advisory capacity. Fines assessed
by the District Court totaling $175,000 were paid by 10 corporate and 13 individual
defendants.
•

U.S. v. Gamewell Company. (D. Mass. 1946). Five company officers also named as
defendants. Conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce and monopoly of municipal
fire alarm equipment. The American District Telegraph Co. and its President were
also named defendants in the first two counts of the indictment, alleging a conspiracy
to monopolize trade in the leasing of equipment to public and private institutions and
the sale of equipment to municipalities. Government alleged that defendants attempted
to monopolize the industry by buying out competitors, acquiring patents and trademarks,
cutting prices, rigging specifications so as to make it impossible for competitors to bid,
and threatening litigation. All of the defendants pleaded nolo contendere and were fined
a total of $43,250.

•

U.S. v. The Kansas City Star Co. (W.D. Mo. 1953). The Kansas City Star Co., Kansas
City, Mo.; Roy A. Roberts, chairman of the board and president of the Star Co.; Emil A.
Sees, treasurer and director of the Star Co., and advertising director of its newspapers
were also named as defendants. The two-count indictment alleged that the defendants
attempted to, and were then, monopolizing the dissemination of news and advertising in
metropolitan Kansas City and that they excluded all others from publishing daily
newspapers in Kansas City. According to the indictment, the defendants, among other
things, refused and threatened to refuse to accept advertising, or discriminated as to
space, location or arrangements of advertising if the advertiser used competing media, or
a larger ad in competing media, and these threats and refusals were implemented by an
elaborate system of surveillance of competing publications. It further alleged that the Star
Company's rate structure for local display advertising provided for tie-in sales which
excluded advertisers from using other media. The grand jury also charged that national
and classified advertisers were required to purchase advertisements in both the Star and
Times, even though they desired to advertise in only one of these newspapers; and that
subscribers to these papers, numbering in excess of 300,000, were required to pay for
delivery of the Times, the Star and the Sunday Star in forced combination, even though
they desired to purchase only one or two of these three newspapers. The indictment also
alleged that news carriers, operating as independent businessmen, were required to
refrain from delivering competing advertising media. The grand jury further charged that
special discounts for advertising in defendants' newspapers were offered to those who
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advertised on defendants' radio station and that advertisers not using defendants'
newspapers were denied access to the Star's; television station. The criminal case was
tried and defendants found guilty. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. On January 23, 1957, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment convicting. The case was ultimately resolved by a
consent decree in an accompanying civil case.
•

U.S. v. National Linen Service Corp. (N.D. Ga. 1955). Four company officers were also
charged with attempting to monopolize and monopolizing the linen service industry in
various southern states. The grand jury charged in the indictment that National had
excluded competitors in the linen service business in the South by buying out hundreds
of competing linen service concerns, and had threatened to force out of business existing
competitors and concerns desiring to engage in the linen service business. According to
the indictment, National had prevented and suppressed competition by conducting price
wars; lowering prices in areas where National had competitors until competition was
eliminated; offering customers service at below cost or free; and giving customers rebates
and other inducements not to deal with competing linen service concerns. The indictment
also charged that National had circulated defamatory or misleading reports among
customers to induce them to refrain from patronizing competing linen service concerns.
It was further charged that, in selected areas, National had induced or compelled linen
service concerns to enter into agreements with it eliminating competition. After a consent
judgment was entered against the defendants in a related civil case, defendants pled nolo
contendere and the court imposed fines of $10,000 on the corporation and $4,000 on each
of the three individual defendants.

•

U.S. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (N.D. Tex. 1955). Two company officers also charged.
Violations of the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts alleged. The indictment was in
three counts. The first charged that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize
the retail grocery business in various cities in Texas and New Mexico. The second count
charged that the defendants were attempting to monopolize this business. The third count
brought under Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act named only Safeway and Warren
as defendants. It charged that Safeway sold goods in its stores in Texas at prices lower
than those it charged in other parts of the United States and below cost for the purpose
of destroying competition. According to the indictment, Safeway established sales quotas
for each of its stores in Texas and New Mexico, amounting to from 25 to 50 per cent of
the total retail grocery business and insisted that the store managers meet these quotas. It
was further charged that Safeway engaged in price wars in these areas for the purpose of
destroying competition and that for that purpose during the course of these wars it sold
groceries below its invoice cost for these commodities. According to the indictment, one
of the effects of the defendants' activities had been to drive some independent grocers in
Texas out of business. The original indictment was voluntarily dismissed by the
government in favor of filing a parallel criminal case (by information) and civil injunctive
case. All defendants pled nolo contendere. The court imposed a fine totaling $187,500
and one-year prison sentences on the individual defendants, which were probabted.
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•

U.S. v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc. (N.D. Tex. 1958). Three companies and three
individuals engaged in the operation and publication of the Herald-Banner newspaper in
Greenville, Texas were also charged. The indictment alleged that, prior to October 1956,
there had been published and distributed in the Greenville area two newspapers, The
Morning Herald and The Greenville Banner. These two newspapers were the only
significant sources of local news, advertising, and other information disseminated
regularly for the residents of the Greenville area through the publication and circulation
of newspapers, according to the indictment. The indictment charged that the defendants,
who had controlled and operated the Banner since 1954, conspired to eliminate the
competition of the Herald, and in fact did do so. The indictment charged that the
defendants conspired to, and did eliminate the competition of the Herald by: intentionally
operating the Banner at a loss, utilizing revenues from other Harte-Hanks newspapers to
finance such losses; lowering subscription rates for home and mail delivery of the
Banner; distributing copies of the Banner free of charge; reducing the display and
classified advertising rates of the Banner; increasing the Banner's advertising staff and
the number of pages published; endeavoring to purchase and purchasing the Herald; and
seeking to curtail credit resources available to the Herald. On January 21, 1959, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, ruled
that the defendants did not violate the antitrust laws.

•

U.S. v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. (W.D. Pa. 1958). Vice-President of company also
charged. The company was the nation's largest manufacturer of bronze grave markers
allegedly controlling at least 75 percent of industry sales. The indictment charged the
defendants with achieving and maintaining a monopolistic position in the industry by
conspiring with its cemetery customers to restrain trade in the sale and distribution of
bronze grave markers. According to the indictment, the company had suggested, and the
cemeteries had adopted, certain restrictive devices designed to prevent the installation of
any bronze grave marker not purchased from the particular cemetery where the marker
was to be installed. In return for this assistance in eliminating their bronze marker sales
competition, the cemeteries were said to have agreed to purchase their own marker
supplies predominantly from the company. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania accepted the defendants' pleas of nolo contendere. The
Court imposed a fine of $10,000 on each of the four counts in the indictment against Jas.
H. Matthews & Co., and a fine of $2,500 on each of two counts was imposed on N. Neilan
Williams, with sentence suspended on the other two counts.

•

U.S. v. General Motors Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Indictment by a federal grand jury on
charges of using its vast economic power illegally to monopolize the manufacture and
sale of railroad locomotives. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy announced the return
of the indictment, which charged that General Motors violated section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Two. substantial competitors were driven from the market and General
Motors captured 84.l% of the locomotive business. As a result, the indictment asserted
that “the purchasers of locomotives and the public in general have been. deprived of the
benefits of competition.” The indictment listed at least 14 ways in which General Motors
assertedly misused its economic power to force most of the nation's 40 railroads to buy
locomotives. The indictment pointed out that General Motors is the largest manufacturing
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corporation in the United States in terms of total sales and assets and is probably the
nation’s largest shipper of freight. As a result, the complaint asserted, General Motors
was able to vary its price and rate of return in locomotive sales, make investments in
manufacturing facilities for railroad locomotives, and establish production capacity in a
manner which no competitor could meet. This power, the indictment asserted, was
“unlawfully acquired and maintained.” Among the ways in which General Motors did
so, the indictment said, included: Routing rail shipments to favor purchasers of General
Motors locomotives and withholding or reducing shipments from lines which purchased
locomotives from General Motors' competitors. Building plants, warehouses and storage
areas near lines of railroads for the purpose of persuading the railroads to purchase
General Motors locomotives. Obtaining steel from General Motors suppliers on terms
which were substantially more advantageous than those available to its competitors.
Financing the sale or lease of locomotives on terms its competitors could not match.
Participating in preparation of locomotive specifications for use in obtaining competitor
bids which prevented other manufacturers from competing. Selling locomotives at a loss
in segments of the market where it had competition. On December 28, 1964, the court
granted the government's motion to nolle prosequi the case
•

U.S. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. (D. Mass 1963). The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Company, Inc. and H. P. Hood & Sons of Boston, the largest milk wholesaler in New
England, were indicted on charges of trying to drive out of business milk dealers who
sell MILK at cheaper prices in glass jugs. The indictment charged Hood with illegally
cutting prices in selected areas, often below cost, in order to destroy competition from
"jug handlers." Attorney General Kennedy said the indictment further charged that Hood
conspired with the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. to restrain competition
and to monopolize the Greater Boston milk market. Approximately 350,000,000 quarts
of milk, worth about $70,000,000 are sold there annually. The indictment said Hood paid
secret rebates to A&P for milk sold in its Boston area stores. Jug handlers process, sell
and distribute milk in gallon and half-gallon jugs, a cheaper form of packaging than the
milk cartons used by Hood and other dairies. The jury found defendants H. P. Hood and
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. not guilty of the charges.

•

U.S. v. The United Fruit Company (S.D. Cal. 1963). Allegations unlawfully
monopolizing the banana market in seven western states. Attorney General Kennedy said
the antitrust indictment also charged United with trying unlawfully to drive out budding
competition by flooding the market and by predatory pricing. The defendants maintained
substantially higher prices in the western states than in markets where they faced
competition, the indictment said. They also were charged with strictly limiting banana
imports in order to shelter the western market from oversupplies which might have
brought down prices. This count said the defendants refused to sell to a number of
wholesalers and allocated bananas in such a way that customers had to buy excessive
amounts during periods of oversupply in order to increase their allotments during periods
of short supply. Starting in July, 1960, two other banana companies-the Standard Fruit
and Steamship Company and Ecuadorian Fruit Import Corporation-joined to import
bananas into Los Angeles by ship. The other two counts charged the defendants with
conspiring and attempting to eliminate this competition. They did so, the grand jury
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charged, by: -Increasing their imports, in order to flood the area with an oversupply of
bananas; -Maintaining maximum inventories with customers to forestall purchases from
Standard-EFIC; -Deliberately reducing wholesale prices, starting July 9, 1960 in order to
keep Standard-EFIC from making any profit; and -Causing the Port of Los Angeles to
deny Standard-EFIC a pier assignment for its banana cargoes. On October 23, 1963, the
following fines were imposed on nolo contendere pleas: United Fruit, $2,000; United
Fruit Sales Corp., $1,000; Joseph H. Roddy, $500; and Marion E. Wynne, $500.
•

U.S. v. Union Camp Corp. (E.D. Va. 1963). Two manufacturers of paper bags, and two
officials of one of the firms were charged with conspiring to exclude competitors through
use of an allegedly invalid patent. The charges related to patents for a paper bag with a
mesh-covered “window” to permit contents such as potatoes and onions to be seen and
ventilated. According to the indictment, Union was issued a product patent in 1947, and
in 1950 initiated a licensing arrangement with selected competitors through which it
collected $50,000 in royalties annually and exerted major control of the industry. Bemis
acquired a patent in 1953 covering the apparatus which produced such bags, and later
transferred all licensing rights under the patent to Union. The government charged that
both firms were aware the Bemis patent was invalid. Through use of the invalid Bemis
patent, Union, according to the indictment, then extended its power to collect royalties
and to block additional competition another six years after its own patent expired in 1964.
The government said Union and Bemis used the invalid patent to force a manufacturer
of window-front bag attachment machinery to restrict sales to Union licensees. Following
nolo contendere pleas, fines totaling $135,000 were imposed as follows: Union Camp,
on the conspiracy count, $50,000 and on the monopoly count, $25,000; Bemis, $50,000;
Mr. Calder and Mr. Bauer, $5,000 each.

•

U.S. v. Empire Gas Corp. (W.D. Mo. 1973). Two individuals were also charged. A
federal grand jury indicted Empire Gas Corp. of Lebanon, Missouri-one of the largest
liquified petroleum gas distributors in the United States and two individuals on charges
of violating the antitrust laws and conspiring to violate federal firearms law in connection
with an unsuccessful attempt to dynamite a tank truck belonging to a competitor. Jury
acquitted defendants.

•

U.S. v. Molasky (E.D. La. 1973). A missouri magazine wholesaler and its two principal
offers were charged with attempting to monopolize the wholesale distribution of
magazines and paperback books in the Gulf Coast area. Defendants attempted to
monopolize by trying to acquire almost all of the local wholesale agencies located in the
area between Victoria, Texas and Pensacola, Florida. In addition, the indictment charged
the defendants induced wholesalers to sell their businesses, by threatening to put them
out of business or otherwise to injure them economically. Defendants entered pleas of
nolo contendere over the objections of the government. On February 12, 1975, the court
accepted Allan Molasky's plea of nolo contendere. On March 11, 1975, each of the
defendants was fined $50,000. A sentence of 1 year, with 11 months suspended, plus 2
years’ probation was imposed on Mark Molasky.
Three concluding observations about these cases: First, the fines meted out for unilateral
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monopolization were concentrated in five cases: NY A&P, Gamewell, Safeway, Jas. H.
Matthews, and Union Camp. The fines imposed in other cases were largely nominal. The total
amount of all fines imposed for unilateral monopolization offenses in 2022 dollars is $8,572,111.
This seems like a pittance compared to the hundreds of millions in fines levied against cartelists
today. All of these decisions were rendered before the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of
1974, which dramatically increased the maximum penalties under the Sherman Act,64 and long
before the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, which raised the
penalties even further.65 In any event, criminal monopolization enforcement operated in a much
more modest penalty environment than criminal antitrust enforcement operates today.
Second, the government failed to achieve a criminal conviction in a comparatively large
share of these cases—8 out of 20. In his empirical study of antitrust enforcement, Richard Posner
estimated the Antitrust Division enjoyed an 81 percent success rate in the antitrust cases it
brought in roughly the same time period as the one studied here—1890 to 1967—and that the
FTC also had an 81 percent success rate in antitrust cases brought from 1915 to 1969.66 Our
sample of 20 unilateral monopolization cases is small, but gives some reason to believe that,
even during periods in which the government was routinely winning civil monopolization cases,
criminal cases were a tougher sell with the courts.
Third, the success rate and fine levels in the unilateral conduct cases were lower than in
coordinated conduct cases. Looking at the 155 coordinated conduct cases, in 99 of the 155 cases
(64%), a party was either convicted, plead guilty, or pled nolo contendere (compared with in
60% of the unilateral cases). In 2022 dollars, $88,171,770 in fines were imposed in 98 successful
cases, averaging $899,712 for successful cases or $568,850 on average for all coordinated
conduct cases.67 The comparable figures for the unilateral conduct cases are an average of
$714,343 in the successful cases and $428,606 in all cases. Thus, the historical data show that
the government’s criminal enforcement in unilateral conduct cases tended to result in lower
conviction rates and lower fines than its conspiracy to monopolize enforcement involving cartel
behavior.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

What are the implications of these findings for the recently renewed prospect of criminal
Section 2 enforcement? On the one hand, the Antitrust Division’s leadership is not wrong to say
that, historically, Section 2 was criminally enforced on a significant scale. Indeed, the raw
number of cases previously brought—175—seems a generous cushion to the agency’s own
estimate of “over 100” cases.68 Further, some of these cases did involve the sorts of unilateral
conduct offenses that the Justice Department may be considering again today. Predatory pricing,
tying, exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and leveraging patents were all theories that the
Justice Department brought criminally.
On the other hand, the vast majority of these monopolization cases were horizontal
conspiracy cases involving price fixing or similar per se offenses and the Section 2 claim added
64

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, Section 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974) (raising maximum
penalty from one year imprisonment and $50,000 fine to three years imprisonment and $1 million fine).
65
Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 201-221, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (raising maximum penalty to ten years in prison and
$100 million fine).
66
Posner, supra n. xxx. Table 11 at 381.
67
Some fines were suspended or remitted, decreasing these values immaterially to $86,978,309; $887,534; and
$561,150 respectively.
68
Powers, supra n. xxx.
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little of substance. Given the substantial fines and jail sentences available for Section 1 offenses
today, there seems to be little need to begin bringing criminal monopolization cases for price
fixing again today. And that does not seem to be the Justice Department’s intention in
announcing a renewed policy of Section 2 criminal enforcement.
As to the 20 unilateral offense cases, peeling away the layers of the onion skin leaves
relatively little as a robust historical precedent. Only 12 of the cases resulted in a finding of
criminal liability, and in most of those cases the penalty was insignificant. Even in the five cases
with comparatively large fines, the fines were trivial compared to the fines imposed in cartel
cases today. As to the possibility of prison time—which seems to be driving much of the political
theater behind the Justice Department’s recent announcements69—the historical record is de
minimis: one executive served one month in prison for a unilateral monopolization offense not
involving violence or threats of violence.
This Article has sought only to establish the historical record, not to engage directly with
the normative questions raised by the Justice Department’s plan to begin bringing criminal
monopolization cases again. As to the normative question, there are a variety of strategic and
moral considerations, including: the advisability of taking on a heightened standard of proof
given the difficulties plaintiffs have in winning monopolization cases even under the civil
standard; potential political backlash if the Justice Department were perceived to overreach; the
fairness of bringing criminal challenges under indeterminate liability standards where outcomes
are difficult to predict; the intentions and purposes of Congress in criminalizing monopolization;
and whether criminal defendants might mount a successful desuetude challenge to the renewal
of a criminal enforcement program abandoned a half decade ago.
The Justice Department’s evocation of the historical record in announcing its new
intentions suggests that past precedent will play a considerable role in the determination of these
questions. The Biden Administration has already played a historical card in aligning its antitrust
enforcement policy with the philosophy of Justice Louis Brandeis.70 As previously noted,
criminal antitrust enforcement reached its peak under the leadership of AAG Thurman Arnold
who, while not quite a full-blown Brandeisian,71 and is held up as a model of antitrust
enforcement by the neo-Brandeisians.72 However, only two unilateral criminal monopolization
cases—Barnett and Chattanooga News-Free Press—were initiated during Arnold’s tenure at the
Justice Department. Of the almost 80 criminal monopolization cases brought during the 1940s
under Arnold and his successors at the Antitrust Division, only three involved unilateral
exclusion theories. For better or for worse, criminal Section 2 enforcement for non-violent

69

See David Reichenberg, Biden’s DOJ Antitrust Division Teases Potential Jail Time for Monopolization, Forbes,
March 14, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidreichenberg/2022/03/14/bidens-doj-antitrust-division-teasespotential-jail-time-for-monopolization/?sh=47ef0cec2ed8
70
See Daniel A. Crane, How Much Brandeis do the Neo-Brandeisians Want?, 64 Antitrust Bulletin (2019).
71
Jerry Fowler, “That Man from Laramie:” Thurman Arnold and the Future of Antitrust, 21 Wy. L. Rev. 267,
285 (2021).
72
See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 163-64 (2018) (describing
Arnold’s actions against monopolies and cartels that had overtaken what “was once a nation of small businesses
and farms”); Zephyr Teachout, Antitrust Law, Freedom, and Human Development, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1081,
1095-96 (2020) (describing “impact of Brandeisian worldview, in combination with Thurman Arnold’s
enforcement strategy” has leading to “a default suspicion of mergers and of concentration in business”); Zephyr
Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub.
Pol’y 37, 63 (2014) (describing Arnold’s role in bringing “antitrust and competition policy to the center of the
Roosevelt Administration’s economic policy”).
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unilateral exclusionary conduct has never been a significant part of the Justice Department’s
enforcement practice.
CONCLUSION
The Justice Department has historically brought a fairly significant number of criminal
cases for violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act—175 of them to be precise. However, only
20 of those involved charges of what today would be considered unilateral monopolization
offenses, of those at least three involved violence or threats of violence, only 12 of the 20 resulted
in a conviction, and the penalties in the successful cases were comparatively small. Hence, if the
Justice Department carries through on its recent threats to begin bringing criminal
monopolization cases again and it does so for non-violent unilateral conduct offenses and seeks
significant penalties, it will be breaking new ground.
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APPENDIX
Defendants
(Primary and
additional)

Year

Nature of allegations

Federal Salt

1903

Armour & Co.
Other corporate and
individual
defendants
American Naval
Stores
Other corporate
defendants and their
officers
John Reardon &
Sons
Other corporate and
individual
defendants

1905

Monopoly in the manufacture and sale of salt
in western states by means of agreements
which eliminated competition and permitted
the fixing and enhancing of prices
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate trade and commerce in meats

Isaac Whiting
Other milk
purchaser
defendants
Sidney Winslow
Others

New Departure Mfg.
Co.
Five other corporate
and 18 individual
defendants
Pacific & Arctic Ry.
Co

Unilateral
Conduct
(UC),
Concerted
Conduct
(CC)
CC

CC

1908

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize the
manufacture and sale of turpentine and naval
stores by eliminating competition through
certain unfair and illegal practices

CC

1910

Conspiracy to eliminate competition in the
purchase of raw materials used in the business
of manufacturing, rendering and producing
tallow, oleo, oil, oleosterin, and fertilizer

CC

1911

Conspiracy to fix and depress prices paid to
milk producers

CC

1911

Combination and conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize the shoe machinery industry by
the consolidation of independent
manufacturers and by a system of leases
containing tying clauses
1912
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in coaster brakes by
fixing uniform prices and terms and
conditions of sale, under cover of a pretended
patent-licensing arrangement

UC

1912

CC

Conspiracy to monopolize the transportation
facilities between Skagway, Alaska, and the
headwaters of the Yukon River by the

CC

Disposition

Defendant pleaded
guilty; $1,000 fine
Individual defendants
dismissed; nolle
prosequi as to
corporate defendants
Following Supreme
Court appeal, second
trial resulted in
acquittal
Nolle prosequi as to
individual
defendants;
corporations pleaded
nolo contendere and
paid $8,000 fine
Defendant Whiting
paid fine of $500 and
charges as to other
defendants dismissed
After Supreme Court
decision, nolle
prosequi
certain of the
defendants pleaded
guilty and others nolo
contendere and fines
aggregating $81,500
were imposed
Statute of limitations
plea sustained
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purchase and abandonment of competing
carriers
Conspiracy to monopolize transportation
between the United States and Yukon River
points by refusing to grant through rates to
other lines and by exacting exorbitant local
transportation and wharfage charges to
shippers using the transportation facilities of
competitors

Pacific & Arctic Ry.
Co

1912

CC

William Hippen
Three corporate
defendants

1913

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate trade and commerce in fruits and
vegetables

CC

Western Cantaloupe
Exchange
Growers and
distributors named
as defendants
William McCoach
32 other master
plumbers

1914

Combination to restrain and monopolize trade
in cantaloupe

CC

1914

Combination to monopolize the business of
selling and installing plumbing supplies

CC

William Rockefeller
Railroad company
officers and
directors of
New York, New
Haven & Hartford
Railroad Company

1914

Conspiracy to monopolize the transportation
facilities of New England

UC

Chris Irving
13 master plumbers
and retail dealers

1914

Combination to monopolize the business of
selling and installing plumbing supplies

CC

After Supreme Court
decision, indictment
was dismissed as to
the individual
defendants, and after
the corporate
defendants pleaded
guilty fines
aggregating $19,500
were imposed
demurrer to the
indictment was
sustained and the
indictment was
dismissed
Indictment dismissed;
relief desired pursued
through bill in equity
Nolle prosequi was
entered as to one
defendant and the
remaining defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and fines
aggregating $5,265
were imposed
Disagreement by the
jury as to five
defendants and six
defendants were
found not guilty;
pleas of immunity
were sustained as to
four defendants, and
a nolle prosequi was
entered as to the
remaining
defendants.
nolle prosequi was
entered as to two of
the defendants, and
the remaining
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Isaac E. Chapman
Others

1915

Jensen Creamery
Co.
Others

1917

Nash Bros.
Others

1917

William M. Webster
Other members of
the National
Association of
Automobile
Accessory Jobbers
Ironite Co.
Others

Walter Moore
Members of the
Steamship Freight
Brokers' Association
and the TransAtlantic Associated
Freight Conferences
Alpha Portland
Cement Co.
73 corporate and 40
individual
defendants

defendants were
found guilty and fines
aggregating $7,250
were imposed
Demurrer of
indictment sustained

Combination and conspiracy to monopolize
interstate trade and commerce in the derrick
lighterage and wrecking business in New
York Harbor and vicinity
Combination and conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
creamery and dairy products in the
Northwestern State

CC

Conspiracy to monopolize trade in fruit by
seeking to prevent competitors from
purchasing fruit from growers and distributors
and by cutting prices to cause competitors to
sustain losses in the sale of any fruit
purchased
1917 Combination to restrain and monopolize trade
in automobile accessories

UC

CC

Not guilty verdict;
nolle prosequi as to
two corporate
defendants

1918

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate trade in pulverized, powdered, and
finely divided iron and other like metal or
metal-contained material used in, or in
connection with, concrete construction work
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
commerce by an agreement providing for the
allowance of a special brokerage fee by
steamship companies to members of the
Association.

CC

Indictment dismissed
after defendant
agreed to consent
decree in parallel
equitable case
demurrer to the
indictment was
sustained and a nolle
prosequi was entered

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in Portland cement

CC

1920

1921

CC

CC

the Jensen Company
pleaded guilty and a
fine of $7,500 was
imposed. The
remaining defendants
were found not
guilty.
Demurrer sustained;
case dismissed

nolle prosequi
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Chicago Master
Steam Fitters' Ass'n
Others, including
association’s
business manager
Louis Biegler
Company
10 corporate and 18
individual
defendants including
representatives of
Amalgamated Sheet
Metal Workers'
Union
Poster Advertisers
Ass'n
Members of Ass’n

1921

Monopoly in restraint of interstate trade in
furnishing and installing heating apparatus in
Chicago

CC

nolle prosequi

1921

Monopoly in restraint of interstate trade in
furnishing and installing heating apparatus in
Chicago

CC

nolle prosequi

1921

CC

nolle prosequi

A.J. Peters
Four others

1922

Defendants had monopolized interstate
commerce in bill posters by requiring
billboard owners who were members of the
Association to receive for exhibition only
those posters furnished by Poster Advertising
Company, and by causing the Poster
Advertising Company to refuse to supply
posters to others not members of the
Association or to serve any advertisers
dealing with its competitors
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in hay

CC

American Terra
Cotta & Ceramic Co
6 corporations and 7
individuals

1922

Combination and conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
terra cotta through the instrumentality of the
National Terra Cotta Society

CC

Indictment dismissed
on motion of
government
Indictment dismissed
as to all but one of
the individual
defendants, and all
but two of the
corporate defendants
pleaded guilty and
fines aggregating
$13,500 were
imposed. Thereafter,
the remaining
corporate de- fendant
pleaded nolo
contendere, a fine of
$1,500 was imposed,
and a nolle prosequi
was entered as to the
remaining individual
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United Gas
Improvement Co.
2 corporations and 8
individuals

Ludowici-Celadon
Co.

Fish Credit
Association, Inc.
24 corporations and
54 officers,
directors, and
employees

1922

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate trade in incandescent lamps, fixtures
and appliances, by securing control of a
number of valuable patents and excluding
others from the use of those patents, by
acquiring and combining competing
companies, and by intimidating competitors.
1929
Conspiracy to monopolize interstate
commerce in the manufacture and sale of
roofing tile by the acquisition of the business,
property, and assets of competing
corporations, and by various unlawful acts
and agreements to exclude and prevent
competition in the sale and installation of
roofing tile.
1933
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in fresh-water fish by
fixing uniform prices, terms and conditions of
sale, by eliminating competition, and by
boycotts, threats, intimidation, and other acts
of violence

Fur Dressers Factor
Corp.
Three unions and
their officers and
directors

1933

Protective Fur
Dressers Corp.
Officers, members,
stockholders

1933

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate trade and commerce in the shipping,
dressing, and dyeing of fur skins, by dictating
prices, terms and conditions of sale and
transportation, and by enforcing such terms
and conditions through violence and
intimidation.
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in rabbit skins by fixing
uniform terms, conditions, and prices, and by
enforcing those terms, conditions, and
prices through violence and intimidation

CC

defendant on motion
of the Government
Nolle prosequi

UC

Defendant pleaded
nolo contendere and a
fine of $5,000 was
imposed

CC

Some defendants
dismissed, others
pled guilty or were
convicted; fines
aggregating $48,387
were imposed against
61 defendants and 12
defendants were
sentenced to
imprisonment for
terms of six months
to two years, the
sentence of eight of
them being
suspended.
Guilty pleas and
convictions before a
jury resulted in prison
sentences of 2 to 15
months and fines

CC

CC

23 defendants
pleaded guilty; two
individuals found
guilty and sentenced
to two years
imprisonment and
$10,000 fines; one
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Union Pacific
Produce Co.
Officers of company

1933

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in artichokes by
preventing, through threats, intimidation and
violence, artichoke receivers, jobbers,
retailers, push-cart peddlers and others, their
customers and employers, from dealing in
artichokes in the metropolitan area of New
York except through the company

UC

American Potash &
Chemical Corp.
Dutch corporation, 4
American
corporations, and 57
individuals

1939

CC

Barrett Company
12 Officers of the
company

1939

Combination and conspiracy in restraint of,
and an attempt to monopolize interstate and
foreign trade and commerce in potash. The
indictment charges that defendants conspired
to maintain uniform prices, terms, and
discounts, refrained from competing, and
refused to sell potash to individual farmers,
farm cooperatives, and fertilizer mixers not
recognized or approved by all of the
defendants
Combination and conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
sulphate of ammonia, a nitrate fertilizer. The
indictment charges that defendants entered
into exclusive sales·contracts with numerous
large producers of sulphate of ammonia and
purchased for resale substantial quantities
from other producers, as a result of which
defendants were enabled to establish uniform,
noncompetitive prices.

UC

defendant’s
conviction reversed
on appeal,
subsequently plead
guilty and was
sentenced to one year
in prison; further
fines imposed on
other defendants
Guilty pleas by all
defendants, fine of
$1000 was imposed
on the company and a
sentence of six
months'
imprisonment was
imposed on each of
two individual
defendants. The
sentences of two
other defendants
were suspended and
those defendants
were placed on
probation for a period
of five years
A nolle prose- qui
was entered as to all
defendants on May
21, 1940, in view of
the entry of a consent
decree in a civil
action involving the
same practices.
nolle prosequi was
entered as to all
defendants in view of
the consent decree
entered in related
civil case
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Chilean Nitrate
Sales Corp.
Seven corporations
and 17 of their
officers

1939

Conspiracy to restrain, a conspiracy to
monopolize, and monopolization of, interstate
and foreign commerce in nitrate of soda, a
fertilizer. defendants entered into agreements
by which uniform prices and terms were fixed
for the sale of all bulk and bag nitrate of soda
produced in the United States or imported
from Chile

CC

Wheeling Tile Co.
Eight tile
corporations, three
incorporated tile
contractors'
associations, two
labor unions, and 35
individuals

1939

CC

Underwood Elliott
Fisher Co.
13 motion picture
corporations and 54
officers

1939

Arthur Morgan
Trucking Co.
Arthur L. Morgan,
its president, Local
No. 600 of the
International
Brotherhood of
Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,
Stablemen and
Helpers, and three
members of the
union

1940

Conspiring to prevent the shipment of tile in
interstate commerce to any contractor in the
Detroit area not a member of the defendant
associations. It was charged that the purpose
was to give members of the associations a
monopoly of the purchase of tile in the
Detroit area and to force independent tile
contractors in that area out of business by
preventing them from purchasing tile and
procuring union labor
Criminal contempt of the consent decree
entered on August 21, 1930, in United States
v. West Coast Theatres, Inc., which declared
illegal under the Sherman Act a combination
and conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate trade and commerce in motion, and
granted a permanent injunction
Combining and conspiring to restrain and
monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
hauling materials and supplies, including
construction materials, by attempts to
eliminate haulers competing with defendant
company in hauling construction materials
and other commodities. It was further
charged that competitors were deprived of
union labor and subjected to threats and
intimidation, that individual haulers were
deprived of union membership, and that fleet
owners were black-listed, subjected to
sabotage, and deprived of experienced labor

one defendant
corporation pleaded
nolo contendere as to
all counts; five other
defendants pleaded
nolo contendere as to
count 1 and were
nolle prossed on
counts 2 and 3; and
two other defendants
were nolle prossed
on all three counts.
Fines totaling
$35,000 were
imposed
all but one of the
defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere and fines
totaling $62,017 were
imposed. The
indictment was nolle
prossed as to the
remaining defendant.

CC

Voluntary dismissal
by Government

CC

All defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere. Fines
totaling $12,006 were
imposed.
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Contracting
Plasterers' Ass'n of
Long Beach, Inc
Three associations
of contractors, two
associations of
dealers in plastering
materials (one of
which succeeded
the other), three
labor unions, nine
corporations holding
membership in the
deal- ers'
association, and 74
individuals
Heating, Piping and
Air Conditioning
Con- tractors Ass'n
of Southern
California
One labor union, 11
corporations, and 62
individuals

1940

Combination and conspiracy in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce by preventing
or restraining the sale, in the Long Beach
area, of plastering materials by non-members
of defendant dealers' association. The
indictment further charges defendants with
preventing or restraining the purchase, in that
area, of plastering materials by non-members
of defendant plasterers' associations, and by
preventing or restraining the application of
plastering materials by non-members of one
of defendant unions. Defendants were
charged, among other things, with the use of
strikes, boycotts, threats, and the destruction
of property to effectuate their purposes

CC

count two of the
indictment was nolle
prossed as to all
defendants and count
one was nolle prossed
as to certain defendants. The remaining
defendants pleaded
nolo contendere.
Fines total- ling
$7,512 were imposed
on 17, sentence being
suspended as to the
remainder.

1940

CC

Nolle prosequi as to
10 defendants; nolo
contendere pleas by
remaining defendant
and fines totaling
$10,044

Hiram W. Evans
Purchasing Agent of
the State Highway
Board of Georgia,
and three
corporations which
manufacture
emulsified asphalt
Levine Waste Paper
Co.
Four corporations
and seven
individuals

1940

Combination and conspiracy in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce in heating,
piping, ventilating, and air conditioning
equipment shipped into California. The
indictment charges that defendants used a bid
depository to control contract prices for
equipment and installation work, prevented
contractors not belonging to defendant
association from obtaining union labor,
supplies and equipment, and in other ways
attempted to restrain trade and create a
monopoly
Conspiracy in restraint of commerce in
emulsified aphalt shipped into Georgia from
outside the state. The indictment charges a
conspiracy to eliminate competition by
selecting bidders and controlling their
proposals to supply emulsified asphalt for
state projects

CC

Nolle contendere
pleas and fines
totaling $30,000

Combination and conspiracy to monopolize
interstate and foreign commerce in waste
paper. The indictment charges that defendants
attempted to eliminate all competitors of
defendant wholesalers, and that the means
used included refusal to buy from retailers
selling to competing wholesalers, denial of
union labor to competitors, refusal by the
union to deliver merchandise to railroads
serving competitors, picketing and

CC

The defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined $1.00 each, or a
total amount of
$11.00

1940
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Lumber Institute of
Allegheny County;
Carpenters District
Council of
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania and
Vicinity, 14
corporations and 34
other defendants

1940

Lumber Products
1940
Ass'n, Inc.
A number of
concerns
manufacturing
millwork and
patterned lumber in
the San Francisco
Bay area, certain
individuals
connected with such
manufacturers, three
trade associations
performing various
services on their
behalf, an
international labor
union, four local
labor unions
affiliated with the
international union,
three trades
councils, and certain
of their members
and representatives
Southern Pine Ass'n 1940
Southern Pine
Lumber Exchange,
an association
dealing in lumber
statistics, and the
National Association

threatening to picket, and threatening to cause
strikes against paper mills which purchase
form competitors
Combination and conspiracy in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce and an attempt
to monopolize the sale of millwork in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The
indictment charges that defendants, by
various means, including strikes, threats of
strikes, and denial of the use of the union
label, attempted to prevent out-of-state
manufacturers from shipping millwork into
Allegheny County, for the purpose of
maintaining high non-competitive prices
Conspiracy to monopolize a part of the
interstate commerce

Combination and conspiracy in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce and an attempt
to monopolize the market for southern pine
lumber by fixing prices, restricting production
and distribution, and by preventing
manufacturers not associated with defendants
from engaging in the lumber business. It was

CC

Nolle prossed as to
all defendants

CC

Following Supreme
Court decision
holding that a
conspiracy to restrain
trade between labor
unions and business
groups violated the
Sherman Act, union
and manufacturing
defendants a total of
$68,000, bringing
the total fines in the
case to $103,000

CC

Defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere. The
Southern Pine
Association was
fined $10,000 and the
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of Commission
Lumber Salesmen

St. Louis Tile
Contractors' Ass'n
Two tile contractors'
associations, one
labor union, three
corporations
engaged in selling
and installing tile,
and nine individuals

1940

Chattanooga NewsFree Press Co.
Two individuals

1940

American Tobacco
Co.
Eight corporations
and certain of their
subsidiaries and
officers

1940

further charged that by various means,
including the use of its trade-mark grademark on lumber and misleading promotional
campaigns, the Southern Pine Association
secured as high as 90% of the southern pine
lumber market in certain trade territories
Combination and conspiracy in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce in tiles, and
attempt to monopolize the purchase, sale and
installation in the St. Louis area of tile in
interstate commerce. The indictment charges
that defendants fixed prices· through the use
of a bid depository, forced national
manufacturers to sell only to members of the
associations, and attempted to eliminate "oneman" and other tile contractors not associated
with defendants. It was charged that fines,
boycotts, and unwarranted denial of union
labor were used in perpetrating the conspiracy

Conspiracy to restrain and an attempt to
monopolize interstate commerce by preventing the operation of competing afternoon
newspapers in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The
information further charges that contracts for
advertising space in issues of the Chattanooga
News-Free Press required advertisers to use
that paper exclusively for afternoon
advertising in Chattanooga
Conspiracy to monopolize, an attempt to
monopolize, and a monopolization of
interstate trade in leaf and tobacco products.
Each of the counts charged that the
defendants combined to acquire control of the
leaf marketing system and exercised control
to destroy the bargaining power of the
farmers; that within the framework of this

other two defendants
$1,000 each

CC

UC

CC

All defendants
entered pleas of nolo
contendere, and fines
totaling $20,011 were
imposed. Two
associations and two
individuals were
fined $5,000 each
and the remaining
eleven defendants
were fined $1.00
each. Execution of
the fines was
suspended for a
period of three years
conditioned upon
defendants'
compliance with the
terms of a consent
decree entered
against said
defendants in a civil
suit
The jury found the
defendants guilty on
count one and not
guilty on count two
of the indictment. A
fine of one cent was
imposed on each
defendant in lieu of
costs
The Supreme Court
granted writs of
certiorari limited to
the question whether
actual exclusion of
competitors is
necessary to the
crime of
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controlled system they fixed prices to be paid
for leaf tobacco; that they secured control of
the distributing system and utilized this
control to fix and control wholesale and retail
prices of tobacco products.

monopolization under
Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The
Supreme Court
affirmed the
convictions, thus
rejecting defendants'
contention that a
definition of
monopolization
which did not require
exclusion of
competitors wou1d
constitute double
jeopardy. The court
held the various
offenses defined by
Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act are
reciprocally
distinguishable from
and independent of
each other, so that
there was no issue as
to multiple
punishment. On June
10, 1946, a motion
for leave to file a
petition for
enlargement of the
scope of review was
denied. On
September 21, 1946,
fines aggregating
$57,000 were
assessed against the
remaining corporate
defendants, of which
$12,000 was
suspended. Total
fines in the case
amounted to
$312,000. The
information was
dismissed as to 13
individual defend-
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Wayne Pump Co.
Four corporations
and four individuals

1941

Monopolizing and conspiring to monopolize
interstate commerce in gasoline computer
pumps

Aluminum
1941
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
Company of
interstate commerce in magnesium and
America
magnesium products. The indictment charges
Dow Chemical Co.,
that defendants combined to prevent others
the only producer of
than Dow Chemical from producing
magnesium in the
magnesium; to limit the production and sale
United States; the
of magnesium products to defendants and
Amerkan
their licensees; to pool competing patents, and
Magnesium Corp.,
to establish uniform prices
the largest fabricator
of magnesium
products in the
United States; two
other American
corporations; I. G.
Farben, a
German·corporation;
and eight individuals
American Surgical 1941
Conspiracy to monopolize a part of the
Trade Ass'n
interstate commerce in surgical supplies. The
24 member
indictment charges that defendants
corporations
established a registration plan whereby any
engaged in the
member of the Association could register any
manu- facture and
article of surgical supplies first produced by
sale of surgical
the member, the other members agreeing not
supplies, and 12
to produce or sell an imitation of the article
individuals
for five years, and to boycott any imitation or
copy

CC

CC

CC

ants and the third
count of the
information was
dismissed as to
certain corporate
defendants.
District Court held
indictment
insufficient; Supreme
Court dismissed
government’s appeal
Pleas of nolo
contendere were
entered by all but
three defendants and
total fines in the
amount of $104,993
were imposed. One
defendant was nolle
prossed. The case
was dismissed as to
the remaining
defendants

In September 1942
the case was
postponed
indefinitely at the
request of the War
and Navy
Departments. On
March 18, 1946, all
corporate defendants
and the trade
association pleaded
nolo contendere, and
total fines were
imposed of $17,000.
The 12 officers were
dismissed from the
case.
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Atlantic
Commission Co.,
Inc.
(Subsidiary of The
Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. of
America)
Trade association of
chain retail store
organizations, 12
corporations
engaged in selling
potatoes and
supplies necessary
in the production of
potatoes, and 17
individuals

1941

Defendants conspired to restrain and to
monopolize interstate commerce by fixing
prices at which potatoes are sold for
distribution throughout the United States by
depressing the price paid to growers, by
establishing exclusive territories of operation
and re- fusing to handle potatoes produced
outside of such territory, and by agreeing to
give preference to each other in purchases and
sales of potatoes

CC

Directed verdict for
defendants

Cranberry Canners,
Inc.
Cooperative
exchange in the
marketing of
cranberries, five
companies and 13
individuals

1941

CC

Two individual
defendants were
dismissed because of
death. Seven
defendants were nolle
prossed; nolo
contendere pleas
were entered by 11
defendants, and fines
totaling $32,000 were
imposed.

Dried Fruit Ass'n of
California
18 corporations
members thereof,
and 29 individuals

1941

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in fresh cranberries and
cranberry products produced in
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon,
Washington and Wisconsin and shipped
through- out the United States. The
indictment charges that defendants suppressed competition between cranberry
products and fresh cranberries by allotting
quotas as between those marketed as fresh
berries and those marketed as cranberry
products, by fixing prices for members and
non-members, and by discriminating against
independent dealers.
Conspiracy to restrain and a conspiracy to
monopolize interstate and foreign commerce
in dried fruit products. The indictment
charges that defendants combined to fix
prices so as to depress the prices paid by
packers to growers and to raise the prices of
the products sold by the packers, and that
defendants effectuated the conspiracy by
uniform buying and selling practices, by
requiring that dried fruit products be
inspected and certified by defendant trade
association, and by deny- ing membership in
said association to packers who sold at
competitive prices

CC

Four defendants
were nolle prossed
before trial and 11
during the course of
trial. Count two
charging a conspiracy
to monopolize was
dismissed as to all
remaining
defendants. The
court granted a
motion for a directed
verdict of not guilty
as to two defendants
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General Electric Co.
Three American
corporations, three
of their officers, and
a German
corporation

1941

Defendants conspired to restrain and to
monopolize interstate and foreign commerce
in patented and unpatented hard metal alloys
and tool dies made therefrom (principally
tungsten carbide). The indictment charges that
the conspiracy was effectuated by acquiring
and pooling competing patents, price fixing,
excluding others, limiting production,
eliminating imports and exports from the
United States, and allotting marketing
territories

CC

Harbison-Walker
Refractories Co
Three American
corporations, four
European
companies, and
seven individuals

1941

CC

National Retail
Lumber Dealers
Ass'n
Two trade
associations of retail
lumber dealers, 37

1941

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate and foreign commerce in magnesite
and magnesite brick. The indictment charges
that defendants combined to control
production and importation of magnesite and
to divide the world market, the exclusive
territory of the American corporations to be
the United States and the exclusive territory
of the European companies to be Europe,
Asia, and Africa.
Conspiracy to restrain and a conspiracy to
monopolize interstate commerce in the sale
and distribution of lumber, lumber products,
cement and other building materials used and
consumed in Colorado, Wyoming and New
Mexico. The indictment charges that

CC

and the jury returned
a verdict of not guilty
as to the remainingdefendants.
All defendants except
the German
corporation pleaded
not guilty. On June
16, 1942, notice was
filed postponing the
case for the duration
of the war at the
request of the War
and Navy
Departments. Trial of
the case was
concluded on March
27, 1947, and on
October 8, 1948, an
opinion was
rendered finding each
of the American
defendants guilty on
all counts. The court
imposed fines on
defendants totaling
$56,000. The
indictment was
dismissed as to the
German corporation.
Four corporate
defendants and seven
individuals pleaded
nolo contendere and
were fined in the total
amount of $76,500.
Case dismissed as to
remaining
defendants.
74 defendants filed
nolo contendere pleas
and the total fines
imposed amounted to
$60,970. The
remaining 18
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corporations and 51
individuals (all retail
lumber dealers), and
two cement
manufacturers

defendants combined to eliminate competition
from manufacturers and wholesalers for the
trade of ultimate consumers, to force
consumers to buy only from recognized retail
lumber dealers, to eliminate competition and
allot territories among themselves, and to
prevent competitors from obtaining supplies
direct from manufacturers and wholesalers
Schmidt Lithograph 1941
Conspiracy to restrain and an attempt to
Co.
monopolize interstate commerce and
20 corporations and
commerce between the Territory of Hawaii
31 of their officers
and the United States in lithographic
or agents
products. The indictment charges that
defendants fixed prices through the
instrumentality of an association by
publishing and exchanging price lists,
eliminated competition among association
members by means of a reporting system
whereby each member was compelled to
quote prices agreed upon, and discriminated
against non-members by predatory pricecutting.
Western Washington 1941
Conspiracy in restraint of commerce in
Wholesale Grocers
grocery products shipped from other states
Ass'n
into the State of Washington and into the
11 corporate
Territory of Alaska. The indictment charges
members of the
that defendants combined to fix prices and to
association, and 13
circulate false rumors concerning available
individuals
supplies of grocery products and concerning
the credit and integrity of other jobbers, and
that they coerced national manufacturers to
refuse to sell to other jobbers

defendants were
dismissed on motion
of the Government.

CC

Indictment was
dismissed as to two
defend- ants and all
remaining
defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere and fines
totaling $128,300
were imposed,
sentence being
suspended as to
certain defendants

CC

Twenty-three
defendants pleaded
nolo con- tendere and
the two remaining
defendants were convicted after a trial
during the course of
which the court
granted a motion to
strike count two of
the indictment. One
of the convicted
defendants was
granted a new trial
and fines totaling
$8,250 were imposed
on the other 24
defendants. The
indictment was
dismissed as to the
defendant who had
been granted a new
trial
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American Waxed
Paper Ass'n
44 corporations
engaged in the
manufac- ture of
waxed paper
products, and 93
individuals

1942

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in waxed products. The
indictment charges, that the defendants
combined to fix prices, that they established
certain methods of manufacture and
distribution and induced others to employ and
utilize them, that they designated the kinds
and quantities of waxed paper to be sold,
published so-called price structures and
circulated "codes of fair competition," and
divided the country into zones
Aqua Systems, Inc. 1942
Restraining and monopolizing interstate
Two corporations
commerce in the sale and installation of
and seven
hydraulic gasoline storage and fueling
individuals
systems and dry gasoline storage system for
fueling aircraft. It is further charged that
unreasonable prices were secured and
competition eliminated through (1) the
acquisition and misuse of patents, (2)
exclusive licensing agreements between
defendants and refusal to license others unless
certain unpatented parts were purchased from
defendants, or installation was supervised by
the defendants at extortionate prices, (3)
submitting artificial bids and inducing others
to submit artificial bids, and (4)
misrepresenting that they owned or were
licensees under patents covering hydraulic
storage systems and special parts thereof
Dairy Cooperative 1942 Conspiracy to monopolize the production and
Ass'n
distribution of milk in the Portland area,
Farmers' cooperative
including milk produced in Washington for
and 10 individuals
sale to Oregon purchasers and milk produced
in Oregon for sale to Washington purchasers.
The indictment charges that defendants forced
producers to dispose of their milk through the
defendant association, discouraged members
from transferring production quotas to nonmembers, required distributors to purchase
from the defendant association, attempted to
obtain control of all distribution outlets in
Vancouver, and granted rebates in order to
force certain distributors out of business

CC

Thirty-two
defendants were nolle
prossed, and the
remaining defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined in the total
amount of $121,125.

CC

CC

Trial by the court
without a jury; the
court found the
defendants not guilty,
holding that under
Section 6 of the
Clayton Act a
farmers' cooperative
association, even
though it becomes
monopolistic, is, if it
acts alone and not in
concert with others,
exempt from
prosecution under the
antitrust laws
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E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co.
Rohm & Haas Co.,
Inc., and 8
individuals

1942

Worldwide conspiracy to suppress
competition and monopolize the manufacture and sale of acrylic plastic (plastics). The
indictment charges fixing of identical prices,
restriction of production, and division of
world markets
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate com- merce in formic acid. The
indictment charges that defendants fixed
prices and controlled production and the
channels and methods of distribution

CC

Jury returned verdicts
of not guilty as to all
defendants.

CC

1942

Conspiracy to restrain and to monopolize
interstate commerce by artificially restricting
and channelizing the sale, processing and
distribution of fish livers, fish viscera and
vitamin oil

CC

On October 5,·1942,
the trial was
postponed at the
request of the War
and Navy
Departments for the
duration of the war.
On July 16, 1945, the
two producing
corporations entered
pleas of nolo
contendere on Counts
1 and 2 and were
fined a total of
$15,000; on the same
date the other three
corporate defendants
were nolle prossed
on Count 2, pleaded
nolo contendere on
Count 1, and were
fined in the total
amount of $7,500,
and a nolle
prosequi was
entered as to all
individual
defendants on both
counts.
Indictment dismissed
after superseding
indictment returned

1942

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in the sale and
distribution of food and food products. The
indict- ment charges that the defendants, by
virtue of their dominant position, are able to

CC

E. I. du Pont de
1942
Nemours &
Company
Two corporations
(the sole commercial
producers of formic
acid in the United
States), three
distributor
corporations and 13
individuals

Halibut Liver Oil
Producers
Two trade
associations, a labor
union, and 17
individuals
New York Great
Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., Inc.
12 of its
subsidiaries, and 17

Case dismissed after
charges filed in
another district
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officers and
directors of these
companies

Rohm & Haas Co.,
Inc.
du Pont, three
dental supply
houses, and 12
individuals

1942

South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n
27 of its officers,
and 198 member
capital stock fire
insurance companies
Swift and Co.
Three meat packers,
a stockyards
company, three
associations of
buyers on the
Denver stockyards
market, five
commission firms,
and 21 officers,
directors or partners
of the foregoing
defendants
Tannin Corporation

1942

1942

1942

control policies and practices in the
production, processing, manufacture and
distribution, both wholesale and retail, of
food products throughout the United States;
that competition was destroyed in local areas
by price wars, price-fixing conspiracies,
coercing dealers to give secret rebates, and
fostering false comparisons of defendants'
prices with those of competitors
Conspiracy to suppress competition and to
monopolize the sale and distribution of
methyl methacrylate (a plastic material used
in approximately 90% of all denture plates)
by maintaining fixed and arbitrary prices on
methyl methacry- late molding powders and
by introducing elements into methyl methacrylate commercial molding powders which
rendered them useless for dental purposes

CC

Conspiring to fix arbitrary and
noncompetitive premium rates on fire
insurance sold by them in the southeastern
states and with conspiring to monopolize
interstate com- merce incident to the fire
insurance business in that area.
Conspiracy to restrain and a conspiracy to
monopolize interstate commerce in fat lambs.
The indictment charges that defendants
conspired to eliminate within the Denver
marketing area all direct purchases of lambs
for eastbound shipment and to confine the
marketing of such lambs to the Denver
Stockyards

CC

Participation in an international cartel to fix
prices and restrain the importation of

CC

CC

At the request of the
War Department the
trial of the case was
postponed
indefinitely for the
duration of the war
and on May 23,
1945, the indictment
was quashed as to
Rohm & Haas, du
Pont and certain
individuals. On
October 1, 1946, the
case was dismissed as
to all remaining
defendants
Following act of
Congress giving
insurance qualified
exemption from
Sherman Act, case
nolle prossed
Indictment dismissed
as insufficient

On January 12, 1943,
three defendants
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Five American
corporations, one
Canadian and one
English company,
and several officers
of defendant
corporations

Victor Chemical
Works
Four corporations
and 14 individuals

quebracho. The indictment charges that
certain quebracho distributors combined to fix
excessive prices for the product throughout
the world, to restrain the shipment of
quebracho by dividing world markets among
themselves through use of a quota system,
and to monopolize the importation of
quebracho into the United States.

1942

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in the production and
sale of oxaclic acid. The indictment charges
that defendants controlled the quantity
produced and the channels of distribution,
established identical prices, refrained from
soliciting orders from customers of other
defendant corporations, and induced other
corporations not to produce and sell oxalic
acid but rather to purchase oxalic acid for
resale from defendants

CC

pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined in the amount
of $22,002. On
February 25, 1943, at
the request of the
War and Navy
Departments, the case
was postponed for the
duration of the war.
On April 19, 1943,
four defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined in the amount
of $37,001, and the
English and Canadian
companies were nolle
prossed because of
inability to procure
service on them. An
order of nolle
prosequi was entered
as to the remaining
defendants August
24, 1943
On October 5, 1942,
an order was entered
postponing the trial
for the duration of the
war, at the request of
the War and Navy
Departments. On
July 16, 1945, all the
individual defendants
were nolle prossed
and a nolle prosequi
was entered on Count
2 as to the corporate
defendants. On the
same date the four
corporate defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere to Count
1 and were fined in
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Virginia-Carolina
1942
Clays, Inc.
Three corporate
selling agencies, 25
corporations and 23
individuals or
partnerships
(members of the
selling agencies)
engaged in manufacturing structural clay
products, and 29
officers of defendant
companies

Conspiracy to restrain and an attempt to
monopolize interstate commerce in structural
clay products. The indictment charges that
defendants fixed and maintained uniform
prices and dictated terms and conditions of
sale which they enforced through a system of
policing and fines, eliminated potential
competition through "recognized dealer lists",
and prevented member and non-member
manufacturers from supplying structural clay
products to manufac- turers or dealers who
were not in good standing

CC

American Air Filter
Co.
Two corporations
and 11 individuals

Conspiracy in restraint of interstate
commerce and an attempt to monopolize the
manufacture and sale of air filters and air
filtering media. The information charges that
defendants obtained a virtual monopoly by
acquiring control of competing firms or by
forcing them out of business, by harassing
them with patent litigation, by agreement
with competitors not to compete with
defendants, and by acquisition and
assignment of patents, and that defendants
fixed arbitrary and non-competitive prices.

CC

1942

the total amount of
$15,000.
Nolle prosequi was
entered as to three
defendants and 63
defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere. The
remaining 14
defendants stood trial
but waived a jury.
After five days of
trial the court
rendered a verdict of
guilty as to one
defendant, the
corporate trade
association.
Immediately, the
remaining 13
defendants withdrew
their pleas of not
guilty and entered
pleas of nolo
contendere. An
appeal taken by the
defendant found
guilty was
dismissed by
stipulation. Fines
totaling $50,650 were
imposed on 77 of the
defendants.
All the defendants
pleaded nolo contendere and fines
aggregating $88,000
were imposed
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Halibut Liver Oil
Producers
Two trade
associations, a labor
union, and 16
individuals

1943

Allied Chemical &
Dye Corp.
Eight American
corporations (two of
which were former
affiliates of I. G.
Farbenindustrie and
three of which
were controlled by
members of a Swiss
Consortium) and 20
individuals

1943

Conspiracy to establish and maintain arbitrary
and restrictive methods and channels of
distribution in interstate and foreign
commerce of fish liver, fish viscera, and
vitamin oil. The indictment charges that, by
threatening to deprive vessel owners of crews
and by threatening fishermen with loss of
union benefits, defendants coerced vessel
owners and fishermen to contract to deliver
exclusively to a tradership all fish livers and
fish viscera obtained by them, and that
defendants had conspired to establish
arbitrary and non-competitive sales prices for
their vitamin oil.
Defendants and certain co-conspirator
chemical companies conspired to restrain and
monopolize interstate and foreign commerce
in dystuffs; established limits on the amounts
of dyestuffs sold by American manufacturers
in foreign markets; fixed prices at exorbitant
levels in the United States; and prevented
small chemical companies in this country
from engaging in the manufacture of
dyestuffs

CC

Jury returned a
verdict of guilty as to
the two trade
associations. the
labor union, and six
individuals, and a
verdict of not guilty
as to the remaining
nine individuals.
Fines totaling $6,750
were imposed.

CC

On June 3, 1942, the
trial of the case was
postponed
indefinitely at the
request of the War
Department, but on
July 21, 1943, the
case was restored to
the active docket. On
March 21, 1946,
defendant General
Aniline and Film
Corp., which
company had been
taken over by the
Alien Property
Custodian, entered a
plea of nolo
contendere and was
fined $15,000. On
April 18, 1946, pleas
of nolo contendere
were entered by 14
defendants, who were
fined $96,000,
making total fines in
the case $111,000.
Ten defendants were
dismissed and the
action has abated
against the remaining
three defendants.
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Consolidated
Laundries Corp.
30 corporations and
12 individuals

1943

Flatwork Ass'n of
Greater New York,
Inc.
Trade association,
12 corporations and
eight individuals

1943

Fruit and Produce
Trade Ass'n of New
York
Trucking
association, a
receiving
association, 27
corporations and 16
individuals
Kroger Grocery and
Baking Co.
Defendant
corporation, three of
its subsidiaries and
five officers and
directors

1943

Linen Supply Board
of Trade of New
Jersey, Inc.
24 corporations and
12 individuals

1943

1943

Price-fixing, allocation of customers, and
attempting to obtain a monopoly in the linen
supply business. The indictment alleges that
certain trade associations were used as a
means of fixing prices and had elaborate rules
and regulations for the policing of the
industry.
Price-fixing, allocation of customers and
attempting to obtain a monopoly in the linen
supply business. The indictment alleges that
certain trade associations were used as a
means of fixing prices and had elaborate
rules and regulations for the policing of the
industry
Conspiracy to restrain and an attempt to
monopolize the business of trucking fresh
fruit and vegetables in the New York market
area. The indictment charges that defendants
fixed uniform and noncompetitive carte
charges and conspired to monopolize by
preventing delivery of fresh fruits and
vegetables except upon terms and conditions
dictated and fixed by defendants
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in food and food
products. The indictment charges that
defendants, by virtue of their dominant
position, are able to control policies and
practices in the production, processing,
manufacture and distribution, both at
wholesale and retail, of food and food
products throughout a large part of the
United States

CC

Case nolle prossed as
to all defendants

CC

Case nolle prossed as
to all defendants

CC

An order of nolle
prosequi was entered
as to six defendants.
The remaining
defendants pleaded
nolo contendere, and
fines totaling $63,000
were imposed

CC

Price-fixing, allocation of customers, and
attempting to obtain a monopoly in the linen
supply business. The indictment alleges that
certain trade associations were used as a
means of fixing prices and had elaborate rules
and regulations for the policing of the
industry.

CC

Indictment dismissed
as to two
subsidiaries; Kroger,
Wesco and two
officials entered pleas
of nolo contendere
and were fined a total
of $20,000. The
remaining defendants
were dismissed on
the same date.
The court sustained
defendants'
demurrers to the
indictment, holding
that the indictment
does not state facts
sufficient to charge
an offense under the
Sherman Act. The
case was then nolle
prossed.
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Linen Supply Ass'n
of Greater New
York; Inc.
Trade association,
39 corporations and
27 individuals

1943

Price-fixing, allocation of customers and
attempting to obtain a monopoly in the Linen
Supply Business. The indictment alleges that
certain trade associations were used as a
means of fixing prices and had elaborate
rules and regulations for the policing of the
industry
Channellizing of distribution and
monopolizing of interstate commerce in
dinnerware and dinnerware sets sold on a
newspaper promotional sales plan

CC

Case nolle prossed as
to all defendants

National Unit
Distributors, Inc.
Four corporations
and four individuals

1943

CC

1943

Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
interstate commerce in the sale and
distribution of food and food products. The
indictment charges that defendants, by virtue
of their dominant position, are able to
control prices and policies in the production,
processing, manufacture and distribution,
both at wholesale and retail, of food and
food products in a large portion of the United
States

CC

Tarpon Springs
Sponge Exchange
Nine corporations
and 26 individuals

1943

Conspiracy to restrain and an attempt to
monopolize the production, transportation and
sale of natural sponges. The indictment
charges that defendants channelized the sale
of all natural sponges produced off the
Florida Coast through defendant Exchange
and obtained a virtual monopoly of such
sponges by various restrictive and
discriminatory practices

CC

Towel Supply
Association of
Greater New York,
Inc.

1943

Price-fixing, allocation of customers and
attempting to obtain a monopoly in the linen
supply business. The indictment alleges that
certain trade associations were used as a

CC

The defendants
entered pleas of nolo
contendere on
November 5, 1943,
and fines totaling
$11,000 were
imposed. $5,000 of
this amount was suspended and
defendants placed on
probation for one
year
Safeway Stores, Inc.,
two of its
subsidiaries and
three of its officers
entered pleas of
nolo contendere and
were fined a total of
$40,000. The
indictment was
dismissed as to the
remaining defendants
on the same day
Court directed a
verdict of acquittal
for 20 defendants and
the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on
both counts of the
indictment against
the 11 other
defendants on trial.
Fines totaling $3800
were assessed
Case nolle prossed as
to all defendants

Safeway Stores, Inc.
Eight of its
subsidiaries, and 13
officers and
directors
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21 corporations and
22 individuals
National Lead Co.
Three corporations
and four of their
officers

1943

Morgan Laundries
Service, Inc.
Two corporations

1943

R. G. Buser Silk
Corp.
14 corporations and
one individual

1943

Standard Coat,
Apron and Linen
Service, Inc.

1943

Wayne Pump Co.
Three manufacturers
of gasoline pumps, a
manufacturer of
gasoline computing
mechanisms, a trade
association and five
individuals
Borax Consolidated,
Ltd.
7 corporations and
11 individuals

1943

1944

means of fixing prices and had elaborate rules
and regulations for the policing of the
industry
Defendants and co-conspirator foreign
companies created a world-wide cartel in
titanium compounds; that they divided world
markets into exclusive, noncompetitive areas;
suppressed competition and obtained
monopolistic control of the industry in the
United States through the pooling of patents;
and imposed a system of restrictive
production on other American manufacturers
Price-fixing, allocation of customers and
attempting to obtain a monopoly in the linen
and towel supply industry. The information
alleges that certain trade associations were
used as a means of fixing prices and had
elaborate rules and regulations for the
policing of the industry
Conspiring to monopolize and restrain
interstate trade in ribbons and ribbon
products, and with agreeing to attempt to
maintain uniform prices and not to sell below
cost
Price-fixing, allocation of customers and
attempting to obtain a monopoly in the linen
and towel supply industry. The information
alleges that certain trade associations were
used as a means of fixing prices and had
elaborate rules and regulations for the
policing of the industry
Conspiracy to restrain and to monopolize
interstate commerce in gasoline computer
pumps

Defendants engaged in the business of
mining, processing, manufacturing, selling
and distributing crude borates, borax and
boric acid, charging defendants with
acquiring control of virtually the entire world
supply by acquisitions and trade practices
which have prevented competition by

CC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
fines totaling $43,000
were imposed. A
$10,000 fine against
Titan Co. was
suspended.

CC

Case nolle prossed

CC

All defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and fines
aggregating $41,000
were imposed
Case nolle prossed

CC

CC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
fines in the total
amount of $27,500
were imposed

CC

All except two
defendants pleaded
nolo contendere. One
defendant was
dismissed and
subsequently the
remaining defendant
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L. S. Eldridge &
Son, Inc.
Five corporations
and seven
individuals

1944

William S. Gray & 1944
Co.
21 corporations, a
trade association and
32 individuals

American firms; allocating foreign and
domestic markets and customers; and
agreeing upon restrictive selling and
distributing methods, terms and conditions,
including the prices at which those products
are sold
Restraint of trade and conspiracy to
monopolize in the importation, sale and
distribution of fish at New Bedford, Mass. It
is charged that defendants secured control of
all facilities for landing fish at New Bedford;
refused access to such facilities to all buyers
except themselves; allocated among
themselves the total supply of fish arriving at
New Bedford; boycotted persons purchasing
fish from other than defendants; and agreed
upon the price to be paid for fresh fish, upon
differentials for resale of fish, and upon
arbitrary unloading rates
Conspiracy to fix the price and to
monopolize the supply of wood alcohol
methanol sold in interstate commerce; and
that production was limited according to
production quotas allocated among the
producers

pleaded nolo
contendere. Fines in
the total amount of
$153,500 were
imposed
CC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere, and
fines totaling $10,000
were imposed

CC

Two defendants
were dismissed from
the case and all
others pleaded nolo
contendere. Fines
totaling $162,524
were imposed, of
which $9,523 was
remitted
All defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere on, and
fines aggregating
$48,000 were
imposed

Affiliated Ladies
Apparel Carriers
Ass'n of the Eastern
Area, Inc.
Four other
associations and
four individuals

1944

Conspiracy to control delivery services within
the New York garment industry. The
information charges conspiracies to control
and restrict and to monopolize the channels
through, and the terms on which, deliveries
of dresses, cloaks and suits are made for the
metropolitan garment industry

CC

Cloak and Suit
Trucking Ass'n, Inc.
Association’s
President

1944

Conspiracies to restrict and control and to
monopolize the channels through and the
terms on which deliveries of dresses, cloaks
and suits are made for the metropolitan
garment industry
Charging that the A & P group by virtue of
its dominant position in the industry is able
to control policies and practices in the
production, processing, manufacturing and

CC

New York Great
1944
Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co.
Defendant
corporation, 11 of its

UC

Both defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and fines
totaling $10,000 were
imposed
Trial of the case
before the court
without a jury. The
Court found three
defendants not guilty
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subsidiaries, 16
officers and
directors, Business
Organization, Inc.,
and public relations
counsel

Washington Culvert
and Pipe Co.
Six corporations and
seven of their
officers

distribution, both wholesale and retail, of food
products throughout the United States

1945

Conspiring to restrain and to monopolize
interstate commerce in metal culverts in
certain northwestern states. The indictment
charges that defendants periodically divided
among themselves, for particular periods of
time, the total probable future sales of
culverts and thereafter allocated accordingly
among themselves the actual sales, by

CC

and all remaining
defendants guilty on
both counts of the
information and fines
totaling $175,000
were imposed. The
Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit,
affirmed the District
Court judgment of
conviction against the
defendants, holding
that the A & P group
had abused their mass
buying and selling
power, and that their
business practices
restrained trade and
tended toward
monopoly. The court
upheld the liability of
the manufacturing
subsidiaries because
of their interlocking
directorates, and
affirmed the
conviction of Carl
Byoir and Business
Organization, Inc.
because of their
advisory capacity.
Fines assessed by the
District Court
totaling $175,000
were paid by 10
corporate and 13
individual
defendants.
All defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and fines
aggre- gating $40,450
were imposed
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General Instrument
Corporation
4 corporations and 6
of their officers

A. B. Dick
Company
5 corporations
and 6 of their
officers

Gamewell Company
5 of its officers

selecting one among them to submit the low
price on each offered bid, by agreeing on the
price to be charged by the selected low
bidder, and by limiting the number of culverts
to_ be fabricated to the volume capable of
disposal at the agreed price.
1946
Conspiracy in restraint of interstate
commerce, monopoly and attempt to
monopolize the production and distribution
of variable condensors (tuning devices used
on radios to select broadcasting
stations).Agreements to fix prices and the
terms and conditions of sale; that they have
allocated among themselves customers and
types of condensers sold; that they have
prevented others from producing condensers
through refusing to fabricate tools for their
use by acquiring and pooling patents; by
refusing to grant licenses under pooled
patents except at unreasonable royalties; and
by the maintenance of infringement actions
1946 Defendants engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of duplicating machines, machine
parts, stencils and other duplicating supplies,
charging defendants with a conspiracy in
restraint of interstate and foreign commerce.
Two British corporations are named as coconspirators. The indictment alleges that
defendants acquired monopoly control over
the stencil duplicating industry through
limiting the business activities of competitors
by threats, coercion and boycotts; acquiring
patents and patent rights, pooling and crosslicensing patents; suppressing evidence as to
the validity of patents; price fixing; illegal
tying practices preventing machine owners
from using supplies of competitors;
preventing competitors from obtaining
essential raw materials; and entering into a
world-wide cartel allocating geographical
areas and fields of business activity
1946 Conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce
and monopoly of municipal fire alarm
equipment. The American District Telegraph
Co. and its President were also named
defendants in the first two counts of the

CC

Indictment dismissed
as to two individual
defendants; other
defendants entered
nolo contendere
pleas; fines totaling
$48,000 imposed

CC

All of the defendants
pleaded nolo contendere and were
fined a total of
$99,000

UC

All of the defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$43,250.
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MacLeod Bureau
Association, 13
corporations and 4
individuals

Union Carbide and
Earbon Corp
Six corporations and
five individuals

Wallace & Tieman
Co., Inc.
9 corporations and 9
individuals

indictment, alleging a conspiracy to
monopolize trade in the leasing of equipment
to public and private institutions and the
sale of equipment to municipalities. It is
alleged that defendants attempted to
monopolize the industry by buying out
competitors, acquiring patents and
trademarks, cutting prices, rigging
specifications so as to make it impossible for
competitors to bid, and threatening litigation.
1946
Conspiracy to fix prices and to monopolize
the distribution and sale of soft coal. The
indictment charges that prices were fixed and
market control achieved by acquiring control
of all coal docking facilities at Boston Harbor,
denying these facilities to competitors,
acquiring control of non-cooperating
distributors, allocating among themselves
types and classes of customers and tonnage,
refusing to supply large users whose
specifications were unsatisfactory to
defendants, refusing to sell to retailers who
would not maintain prices fixed by
defendants, agreeing on arbitrary discounts to
various classes of consumers, refusing to sell
coal at prices below those set by the OPA,
and by collusive bidding
1946
Conspiracy to monopolize interstate and
foreign commerce in vanadium. The
indictment alleges that defendants refrained
from competing with each other in purchasing
deposits, deprived competitive mills of
sufficient ore to operate profitably, forced
independent processors out of business,
caused independent ore miners to sell below
cost or sell their deposits to defendants,
apportioned all business among themselves,
and sold to the public at arbitrary prices.

1946

Conspiracy in restraint of interstate
commerce and monopoly in the production
and distribution of gas chlorinating equipment
(used in the treatment of water and of

CC

The corporate
defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere and were
fined the total of
$24,500, and on the
same day the
individual defendants
were dismissed

CC

One individual
defendant was
dismissed. An order
was made granting a
motion to dismiss the
indictment as to each
and all defendants
and, upon
permission, a
criminal information
was filed against
Union Carbide and
Carbon Corporation
and 4 other
defendants.
On December 21,
1946, defendants
moved to dismiss the
indictment on the

CC
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sewage; in the ageing and bleaching of flour;
paper and textiles; and in the prevention of
raw food spoilage) and in the manufacture
and sale of chlorine compounds. It is alleged
that defendants acquired and misused patents,
threatened infringement suits, acquired the
business of competitors, refused to furnish
supplies· and services in connection with
chlorinating equipment unless the equipment
was obtained from defendants; divided the
field by entering into agreements not to
compete, to fix prices, terms and conditions
of sale, cutting prices, rigging specifications
so as to make it impossible for competitors to
bid, and preempting the major outlets and
preventing competitors from obtaining
essential parts and appliances.

National City Lines,
Inc.
9 corporations and 7
individuals

1947

Conspiracy to acquire control of a
substantial part of the local transportation
companies in the United States, and to
restrain and monopolize domestic trade in the
sale of busses, tires, tubes, and petroleum
products to a nation-wide combine of city
bus lines controlled by National City Lines,
Inc. The indictment alleged that supplier
defendants furnished capital to National and
its subsidiaries on condition that the
transportation companies purchase all their
tires, tubes, petroleum products and busses
from supplier defendants and also use capital
so furnished by supplier defendants to
purchase or secure control of or financial
interest in local transit systems in various
states. In return, the defendant transportation
companies agreed not to renew any of their

CC

ground women were
not in the panel from
which the grand
jurors were selected.
On March 21, 1947,
the Court granted the
defendants' motions
to dismiss the
indictment, and on
May 1, 1947, an
information was filed
alleging the same
unlawful acts. On
February 6, 1948, the
Court granted the
defendants' motion
for the return of
impounded
documents on the
ground that the
subpoenas under
which the documents
were obtained were
issued by an illegally
constituted grand
jury and therefore
constituted illegal
search and seizure
The jury returned a
verdict of guilty
under Count 2 of the
indictment, and fines
totaling $36,007 were
imposed.
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The AmericanLaFrance-Foamite
Corporation
2 corporations and 4
individuals

Wallace & Tieman
Co., Inc.
9 corporations and 9
individuals

contracts to purchase tires, tubes, petroleum
products and busses with companies other
than supplier defendants without their consent
or dispose of any interest in any operating
company without requiring the party
acquiring the operating company to assume
obligation of continuing to purchase from
supplier defendants. It was further agreed
that the defendant transportation companies
would not change or alter their present
equipment or purchase new equipment so as
not to be able to use supplier defendants'
products. The motor bus, petroleum, tire and
tube business would be allocated and divided
among the supplier defendants.
1947
Conspiracy to restrain interstate trade by
monopolizing and attempting to monopolize
the production and distribution of motor
driven fire apparatus. It was alleged that the
defendants agreed on terms of sale and prices,
trade-in allowances, to submit complementary
or dummy bids in order to provide color of
compliance with laws, and included arbitrary
freight charges in prices. It was also alleged
that the defendants agreed to use their
influence and position to discourage others
from bidding and offered to influence awards
to themselves by improper inducements
1947
Conspiracy to restrain and monopolize the
production and distribution of chlorinating
equipment, and the manufacture and sale of
chlorine compounds. It is alleged that the
defendants acquired and misused patents,
threatened infringement suits, acquired the
business of competitors, refused to furnish
supplies and services in connection with
chlorinating equipment unless the equipment
was obtained from the defendants, divided the
field by entering into agreements not to
compete, to fix prices, terms and conditions
of sale, cutting prices, rigging specifications
so as to make it impossible for competitors
to bid, and preempting the major outlets and
preventing competitors from obtaining
essential parts and appliances

CC

All the defendants
entered pleas of nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$50,000

CC

Two groups of
defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$63,000
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Consumers Ice
Company
3 corporations and 1
individual

General Electric Co.
6 corporations and 7
individuals

The Metropolitan
Leather and
Findings
Association
1 incorporated trade
association, 12
corporations, and 35
individuals

1948

Monopolizing the manufacture and
distribution of ice in Louisiana, Texas, and
other states. The indictment charges that
defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy
and concert of action by acquiring
competitors' businesses in the area, limited
areas in which competitors operate and
their sources of supply of ice by threats of
destructive trade practices; and destroyed
competition by selling at destructively low
prices or giving ice away, then raising prices
in such local areas higher than defendants'
prices else- where. The indictment further
charges defendants forced competitors in
certain areas to sell at prices fixed by them
above the prevailing market price
1948
Price fixing and illegal conspiracy among
defendants in restraint of interstate trade and
commerce in street lighting equipment. The
indictment alleges that the defendants
monopolized the industry by buying up
competitors, entering into exclusive contracts,
refusing to sell parts to remaining
competitors, inducing part suppliers not to
sell direct, price fixing and allocating sales
territory
1948
Conspiracy to fix prices, and in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce in leather and
shoe findings. The indictment charges that
defendants conspired to fix prices at which
leather was sold to finders; that defendant
producers refused to sell leather and shoe
findings directly to shoe repairmen or to
finders or wholesalers not approved by. the
association; that defendant wholesalers
refused to sell to finders not approved by the
association; that defendant finders refused to
sell to other than approved shoe repairmen
and boycotted producers and wholesalers who
would supply unapproved finders; and that
the association limited the number of finders
to be accepted as members.

CC

The jury found all
defendants guilty
under Count 1 of the
indictment. No
verdict was returned
on Counts 2 and 3.
Fine of $500 was
imposed on the
individual defendant,
and sentence was
suspended as to the
def endant companies

CC

Defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere and were
fined total of $78,000

CC

On January 10, 1949,
the defendant
association and 20 of
its members, who are
engaged in the
business of
purchasing leather
and shoe findings for
resale mainly to shoe
repairmen, entered
pleas of nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$36,250. On the same
date, the indictment
was dismissed as to
one individual and
two corporate defendants. On April
20, 1949, seven
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Universal
Carloading and
Distributing Co.
2 national freight
forwarding
companies

1948

Union Carbide and
Carbon Corporation
4 other corporations

1948

Conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade and
commerce in the shipment of household
goods in the Washington, Oregon and
California area. The indictment charges that
the defendants by agreement and concert of
action have eliminated competition between
themselves and excluded the competition of
other forwarders and have fixed and
manipulated rates and commissions in the
shipment of household goods and personal
effects in the area named
Combined and conspired to restrain and
monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
ferrovanadium and vanadium ore. The
information charges that defendants by
continuing agreement and concert of action
purchased or acquired control over
substantially all vanadium oxide produced by
others in the United States, and that by
refusing to sell vanadium oxide to producers
of ferrovanadium, the defendants agreed upon

CC

CC

corporate and 13
individual defendants pleaded nolo
contendere, and fines
were assessed
totaling $44,250. In
accepting the pleas,
the court warned that
jail sentences would
be imposed if the
defendants were
brought into court
again on similar
charges. Three
corporate defendants
were dismissed on
the same date. The
remaining defendant
pleaded nolo
contendere on May 9,
1949, and was fined
$1,250. Total fines in
the case amounted to
$81,750.
Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere, and
$10,000 fine was
imposed on each.

Jury returned verdict
of not guilty
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L. Longoria and
1949
John E. Foster
(2 individual
defendants)
The Great Western 1949
Food Distributors,
Inc.,
Two corporations
and three individuals

and fixed prices for the sale of ferrovanadium
and vanadium oxide.
Defendants were alleged to have fixed prices,
intimidated and excluded competitors in the
ice and icing service industry

CC

Conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade
and commerce in eggs deliverable on
October, 1949, futures contracts on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange

CC

The defendants entered into agreements
channeling the distribution of used batteries
fixed prices back to the defendant smelter
company, which in turn agreed to sell the
lead to the original manufacturer. An
association was formed to supervise the
channeling of used batteries and salvaged
lead; divide the United States into operating
territories and prevent sales to rebuilders
Atlantic Company
1950 Defendants were alleged to have fixed prices,
Seven corporate and
allocated manufacturing demand, limited
two individual
production and distribution, exerted undue
defendants
influence on competitors, sold below cost to
drive out competition, and acquired monopoly
control through interlocking directorates,
acquisition of stock and physical assets in the
ice and ice servcing business in the southern
states.
Joseph A. Krasnov 1950 Defendants obtained monopoly control of the
One corporation and
ready-made slip covers business in the
three individuals
Philadelphia area through patent licensing
agreements and threats of infringement suits.
Defendants also allegedly engaged in
exclusive dealing, intimidation, and
discrediting of competitors' products.
L. A. Young Spring 1950
Defendants, manufacturers of wire garment
and Wire
hangers, were alleged to have obtained
Corporation
monopoly control of the industry east of
Three corporations
Denver, Colorado. According to the
and three individuals
indictment, defendants fixed prices, made
use of a basing point system, exchanged
price information and customer data, granted

CC

Association of
American Battery
Manufacturers
23 corporations and
24 individual
defendants

1950

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
fines were imposed
totaling $1,200
One corporate
defendant was
dismissed; all
remaining defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$3,700.00.
Defendants entered
plea of nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$10,250.

CC

Defendants acquitted
by jury verdict

CC

Nolo contendere
pleas, fines totaling
$11,000

CC

All defendants
entered pleas of nolo
contendere, and fines
totaling $42,000 were
imposed. $2,500 of
this amount was
suspended
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Local 33 of the
International
Fishermen and
Allied Workers of
America
2 unions, 7
individuals

1950

Atlantic Fishermen's
Union
Trade association,
two unions and five
officials of the trade
association

1951

Pittsburgh Crushed
Steel Company
One association, 12
corporations and
four individuals

1951

William D. Eldridge
Three corporations
and three officials
thereof

1951

Golden Gate
Chapter, National

1952

uniform discounts, and policed the industry
to compel adherence to the system imposed.
Defendants stabilized prices per ton at
which sardines and mackarel (fresh) would
be sold; limited the amount of the catch in
order to sustain the price structure; and
designated the time at which and the canner
for whom the boats might fish. Policies were
enforced by confiscation of the catch and
fines imposed on those found violating the
rules.
Conspiring to restrain and monopolize the
marketing and catch of fresh and scallops.
The defendants are charged with limiting the
amount of the catch, fixing prices, excluding
non-members of the association from fishing
and marketing, and preventing fish dealers
from purchasing except upon terms and
conditions imposed by the defendants. The
government seeks to destroy the conspiracy
and to open the market to non-members of
the defendant association
The defendants are charged with initiating
price wars, purchasing competitors, acquiring
managerial control over independent companies, and inducing officers of prior
competitors to stay out of the metal abrasives
business. Allegedly, defendants also
threatened competitors with unwarranted
patent infringement suits and divided fields
with machinery manufacturers which kept the
latter out of metal abrasive production. The
Kann organization and other defendants are
alleged to have engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy through the Metal Abrasives
Council.
Defendants conspired to restrain trade and to
monopolize the sale of scallops. The
defendants are further charged with
conspiring and combining to limit the
amount of the catch, to persuade boat
owners from fishing at certain times, and to
refrain from buying at specified periods.
Conspiracy to restrain and to monopolize
interstate trade and commerce in the

CC

CC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
fines totaling $1,075
were imposed under
Count 1 of the
indictment. Sentence
under Count 2 was
suspended and
defendants placed on
one year probation
Nolo contendere
pleas; fines totally
$12,000 imposed

CC

Corporate defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined $50,500.
Individual defendants
were dismissed.

CC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
fines totaling $7,250
were imposed.

CC

Pleas of nolo
contendere as to
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Electronic
Distributors Assn.
Trade association,
five corporations,
and six individuals

The Union Ice Co.
Nine corporations, a
trade association,
and seven
individuals

wholesale distribution of radio and electronic
parts. The indictment charged that through the
medium of their association the defendants
conspired to prevent wholesale distributors
who were not members of the association, or
not recognized by the defendants as
"legitimate" wholesalers, from engaging in
the wholesale distribution of radio and
electronic parts in northern California. The
indictment alleged that wholesale distributors
in the northern California area purchased
radio and electronic equipment through
manufacturers’ representatives, who were
named in the indictment as co-conspirators.
As part of the conspiracy, the indictment
charged that the defendants agreed to boycott
manufacturers' representatives who sold radio
and electronic parts to wholesale distributors
not members of the defendant association or
not recognized by the defendants as
"legitimate" wholesale distributors. It was
also charged that the defendants induced and
caused these manufacturers' representatives to
refrain from selling such equipment to said
wholesalers, and, in return for the agreement
by these manufacturers' representatives not to
sell to such wholesalers, the defendants give
preference in their sales to the types and
brands of equipment sold by these
manufacturers’ representatives. The
indictment alleged that the effect of this
conspiracy was to exclude wholesale
distributors not members of the association or
not recognized as "legitimate" wholesalers,
and to prevent new distributors from entering
into the wholesale distribution of radio and
electronic parts in northern California
1952
Conspiracy to restrain and to monopolize
interstate and foreign trade and commerce in
California in the sale and distribution of ice,
and the furnishing of icing services.
It was charged that the defendants and coconspirators controlled, manufactured and
distributed over 80% of such ice. The
indictment was in two counts and charged
that the defendants conspired to restrain and

count 1 and 2 were
entered, and fines of
$40,000 were entered
as to count 1. No
fines were entered as
to count 2

CC

Pleas of nolo
contendere were
entered and fines
amounting to
$16,806.00 were
imposed
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Employing Lathers
Assn. of Chicago
and Vicinity

1952

monopolize this business by fixing uniform
and noncompetitive prices at which ice and
icing services would be sold in California;
eliminating competition among the
defendants and co-conspirators; controlling
and limiting the amount of ice produced and
sold in particular territories; and dividing and
allocating the market for ice and the
furnishing of icing services. It was alleged
that in carrying out the conspiracy, the
defendants entered into written contracts
which determined the amount of ice to be
produced, that common or joint delivery
companies were formed through which all
sales of ice in particular areas were funneled,
and that competitive manufacturing plants
were purchased or leased and subsequently
closed or production thereof curtailed.
Lathing contractors' association, a local
lathing union, and two individuals with a
conspiracy to suppress competition among
lathing contractors and to restrict and exclude
persons from engaging in the lathing
contracting business, and to monopolize the
installation in the Chicago area of lathing
materials. The indictment charged that the
defendants agreed to restrict and reduce the
number of lathing contractors permitted to
engage in business in Chicago by excluding
any person from becoming a lathing
contractor who had not been approved by
Local 74. It was charged that Local 74
refused to approve any prospective lathing
contractor who had not been a member of
Local 74 for five years. Since previous
membership in Local 74 was required of any
prospective lathing contrator, the restrictive
membership standards used by Local 74 have
had the effect of reducing the number of
persons eligible to become lathing contractors
in Chicago. Thus the indictment alleged that
Local 74 excluded from membership persons
who were not related, by blood or marriage,
to members of Local 74, and has also
excluded certain racial and religious groups
from membership in that union.

CC

Defendants nolle
prossed.
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Employing
1952
Plasterers Assn. of
Chicago
Plastering
contractors'
association, a local
plastering union, and
the president of the
union

CC

The Federal District
Court in Chicago
ordered the dismissal
of the case upon the
Government's motion
of nolle prosequi.

Baugh & Sons Co.
Seven corporations
and nine individuals

CC

All defendants
entered pleas of nolo
contendere, and fines
in the amount of
$85,850 were
imposed, $42,925 of
which were
suspended.

CC

Corporate defendants
pleaded nolo
contendere and were
fined $12,500

The Great Western
Food Distributors,
Inc.
The Great Western
Food Distributors,

Conspiracy to suppress competition among
plastering contractors and to restrict and
exclude persons from engaging in the
plastering contracting business, and to
monopolize the sale, distribution and
installation of plastering supplies by
plastering contractors, in the Chicago area. he
indictment charged that the defendants
conspired to prevent any person from
engaging in the plastering contracting
business in Chicago who had not first secured
the approval of Local 5 and Byron Dalton,
and that no one was permitted to engage in
business as a plastering contractor who had
not been a member of Local 5 for a period of
five years. It was charged that the defendants
excluded out-of-state plastering contractors
from performing plastering in Chicago and
that any out-of-state plastering contractor
undertaking such work in Chicago was
harassed by means of work slow-downs and
other practices directed to making such
plastering prohibitive in cost.
1952
Conspiring to restrain and to monopolize,
attempting to monopolize and monopolizing
interstate commerce in the rendering industry
in the Philadelphia area. The defendants, who
purchased approximately 90 per cent of the
rendering material collected in the
Philadelphia area, were alleged to have
agreed upon the prices to be paid for the
purchase of rendering material from suppliers
in the Philadelphia area, and to have agreed
not to solicit business from those suppliers
from whom any other defendant purchases
rendering material. It was further alleged in
the indictment that the defendants agreed to
prevent any person from entering the
rendering business and to force other
renderers out of business in the Philadelphia
area.
1952 Charging price manipulations, cornering and
monopolization of egg futures on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange. This information
charged the defendants with attempting to
manipulate and manipulating the prices of and
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Inc., New York
City, and Chicago.
Industrial Raw
Materials Corp.,
New York City.
Nathaniel E. Hess,
Long Island,
president of The
Great Western Food
Distributors, Inc.
Charles S. Borden,
residing at La
Grange, Ill., a vicepresident of The
Great Western Food
Distributors, Inc.,
and manager of its
Chicago office.
Edward B. Gotthelf
and Jack Rauch,
partners, New York
City, also known as
Eastern States
Advertising Agency
Michigan Tool Co.
Three corporations

attempting to corner eggs for future delivery
in October, 1949, on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, in violation of the Commodity
Exchange Act. The other information charged
The Great Western Food Distributors, Inc.
and Nathaniel E. Hess with attempting to
manipulate and manipulating prices of and
attempting to comer and cornering eggs
deliverable on November, 1949, futures
contracts, in violation of the Commodity
Exchange Act, and with monopolizing such
eggs.

1953

Conspiracy to restrain and to monopolize
interstate and foreign trade and commerce in
gear cutting and finishing machines and tools.
The indictment charged that since 1937 the
defendants, through patentlicensing and
cross-licensing agreements, had (a) allocated
among themselves various fields in the
manufacture and sale of gear cutting and
finishing machines and tools; (b) refrained
from competing in certain fields of
manufacture and sale in which the other
defendants were engaged; (c) adhered to
published prices, discounts, terms and
conditions of sale in the manufacture and sale
of gear cutting and finishing machines and
tools; ( d) exchanged among themselves on an
exclusive basis their respective patents and
technology relating to the manufacture of
these machines; (e) allocated customers
among themselves; and ( f) agreed not to
license others without the consent of the other
defendants.

CC

The court accepted
the defendants' pleas
of nolo contendere,
and on June 27, 1956,
each of the three
defendants was fined
$3,750 on each of the
two counts in the
indictment, making a
total fine of $22,500.
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Walton Hauling &
Warehouse Corp
Four corporations, a
labor union, and five
of their officers

1953

Conspiring to restrain and to monopolize,
attempting to monopolize and monopolizing
interstate trade and commerce with respect to
the hauling of theatrical scenery and
equipment. The indictment charged that the
defendants conspired to fix high,
unreasonable and non-competitive prices;
allocated customers among themselves;
excluded independents from transporting
theatrical scenery and equipment; and used
the coercive power of Local 817 to compel
theater owners, producers and television
stations, by threat of picketing and other
means, to abide by the conspiratorial
agreements of the defendants.

CC

The Kansas City
1953
Star Co.
The Kansas City
Star Co., Kansas
City, Mo.; Roy A.
Roberts, chairman of
the board and
president of the Star
Co.; Emil A. Sees,
treasurer and
director of the Star
Co., and advertising
director of its
newspapers

The two-count indictment alleged that the
defendants attempted to, and were then,
monopolizing the dissemination of news and
advertising in metropolitan Kansas City and
that they excluded all others from publishing
daily newspapers in Kansas City. According
to the indictment, the defendants, among
other things, refused and threatened to refuse
to accept advertising, or discriminated as to
space, location or arrangements of advertising
if the advertiser used competing media, or a
larger ad in competing media, and these
threats and refusals were implemented by an
elaborate system of surveillance of competing
publications. It further alleged that the Star
Company's rate structure for local display
advertising provided for tie-in sales which
excluded advertisers from using other media.
The grand jury also charged that national and
classified advertisers were required to
purchase advertisements in both the Star and
Times, even though they desired to advertise
in only one of these newspapers; and that
subscribers to these papers, numbering in
excess of 300,000, were required to pay for
delivery of the Times, the Star and the

UC

Defendants with the
exception of Local
Union No. 817 and
Edward O'Donnell
changed their pleas of
not guilty and entered
pleas of nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$10,000. On July 15,
1955, the union
entered a plea of nolo
contendere and a fine
of $2,500.00 was
imposed and the
defendant Edward
O'Donnell was
dismissed. Total fines
imposed amounted to
$12,500.00.
The criminal case
was tried and
defendants found
guilty on February
22, 1955. On August
5, 1955, the court
overruled the
defendant's motions
to set aside the
verdict of guilty and
for judgment of
acquittal, or in the
alternative for a new
trial. The defendants
appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. On
January 23, 1957, the
United States Court
of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit
affirmed the
judgment convicting
The Kansas City Star
Co. of attempting to
monopolize and
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National Malleable
and Steel Castings
Co.
Six corporations and
four individual
persons

1953

Cigarette
1954
Merchandisers Assn.
Trade association,
five corporations, a
labor union and
seven individuals

Sunday Star in forced combination, even
though they desired to purchase only one or
two of these three newspapers. The
indictment also alle ed that news carriers,
operating as independent businessmen, were
required to refrain from delivering competing
advertising media. The grand jury further
charged that special discounts for advertising
in defendants' newspapers were offered to
those who advertised on defendants' radio
station and that advertisers not using
defendants' newspapers were denied access to
the Star's; television station.
Combining and conspiring to restrain and to
monopolize, and by monopolizing, interstate
and foreign commerce in railroad car
couplers, coupler parts and yokes. The
indictment charged that the defendants
unlawfully conspired to prevent anyone other
than the defendant manufacturers from
making and selling couplers and coupler parts
which had been adopted as standard by the
Association of American Railroads, in part by
securing and pooling patents covering said
couplers and maintaining control by
defendant manufacturers of drawings and
gauges necessary to the production of said
couplers. Further activities alleged in the
indictment included the fixing and
maintenance of uniform and non-competitive
prices for couplers, coupler parts and yokes;
division and apportionment among defendant
manufacturers of available business in
couplers and coupler parts; exclusion of
others from the manufacture and sale of
certain types of yokes; division of world
markets under agreements with certain
foreign producers; agreements as to world
prices; and exclusion of importations of
couplers and coupler parts.
The indictment charged that for many years
defendants had conspired to suppress and to
eliminate competition among cigarette
vending machine operators who were
members of the association. It further alleged
that defendants have attempted to monopolize

monopolizing
interstate trade and
commerce in the
dissemination of
news advertising and
Emil A. Sees of
attempting to
monopolize such
trade and commerce.

CC

The defendants
entered pleas of nolo
contendere and were
fined a total of
$80,000

CC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
fines totaling
$155,000 were
imposed
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Maryland State
Licensed Beverage
Assn., Inc.
Two state retail
associations, one
state wholesale
association, fourteen
distiller
corporations, seven
wholesalers, and
thirty-one
individuals
connected with the
associations and
corporations

1955

National Cranberry
Assn.
Cooperative, two
corporations, and
two individuals

1955

and had monopolized the sale of cigarettes
through vending machines so as to exclude
independent operators of such machines from
this business. The indictment also charged
that defendants had used the union, Local
805, to enforce and police the conspiracy by
means of boycotts and picketing.
The indictment charged that beginning on or
about January, 1950, the defendants entered
into a combination and conspiracy to raise,
fix, maintain, and stabilize the wholesale and
retail prices of alcoholic beverages shipped
into Maryland, in restraint of interstate trade
and commerce. It was alleged that the
substantial terms of the combination and
conspiracy were that so-called "fair trade"
prices for alcoholic beverages were required
to be established and that manufacturers and
wholesalers were required to enforce the
observance of such prices. It was alleged also
that retailers were required to observe and
adhere to, or were induced and compelled to
observe and adhere to such "fair trade" prices.
The indictment further alleged that it was a
term of the conspiracy charged that no
alcoholic beverages would be sold directly to
the Department of Liquor Control for
Montgomery County and to the liquor control
boards of the seven other "monopoly
counties,'' and that alcoholic beverages sold to
the official agencies of these "monopoly
counties" would be sold only through a
wholesaler who charged the "monopoly
counties" his customary resale price. The
indictment charged that manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers agreed to boycott
and to induce others to boycott those who did
not adhere to the terms of the conspiracy.
Combining and conspiring to restrain
interstate trade in the manufacture and sale of
cranberry products, with combining and
conspiring to monopolize such trade, and
attempting to monopolize and monopolizing
such trade. defendants induced and compelled
independent cranberry growers, other
cooperatives and independent shippers of

CC

The court accepted
nolo contendere pleas
from most of the
defendants and
imposed fines of up
to $10,000 on
defendants.

CC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
imposed fines
totaling $37,500
imposed.
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Safeway Stores, Inc.
Two of its officers

1955

cranberries to sell solely to the defendant
association all cranberries to be used in the
manufacture of cranberry products, and
agreed to limit and confine the manufacture
of cranberry products solely to the
association. In addition, the defendants were
charged with preventing, eliminating, and
excluding competition from independent
manufacturers and from other cooperatives in
the manufacture and sale of cranberry
products, and of controlling and regulating
prices and terms of sale for cranberry
products.
Violations of the Sherman and RobinsonPatman Acts. The indictment was in three
counts. The first charged that the defendants
engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize the
retail grocery business in various cities in
Texas and New Mexico. The second count
charged that the defendants were attempting
to monopolize this business. The third count
brought under Section 3 of the RobinsonPatman Act named only Safeway and Warren
as defendants. It charged that Safeway sold
goods in its stores in Texas at prices lower
than those it charged in other parts of the
United States and below cost for the purpose
of destroying competition. According to the
indictment, Safeway established sales quotas
for each of its stores in Texas and New
Mexico, amounting to from 25 to 50 per cent
of the total retail grocery business and
insisted that the store managers meet these
quotas. It was further charged that Safeway
engaged in price wars in these areas for the
purpose of destroying competition and that
for that purpose during the course of these
wars it sold groceries below its invoice cost
for these commodities. According to the
indictment, one of the effects of the
defendants' activities had been to drive some
independent grocers in Texas out of business.
According to the indictment, Safeway in 1954
sold more than $155,000,000 of food and
food products in Texas and New Mexico and

UC

Original indictment
was
voluntarily
dismissed by the
government in favor
of filing a parallel
criminal case (by
information) and civil
injunctive case. All
defendants plead nolo
contendere. The court
imposed
a
fine
totaling $187,500 and
one-year
prison
sentences on the
individualdefendants,
which
were
probabted.
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National Linen
Service Corp.
Four of its officers

Radio Corp. of
America

sold substantially more of these products in
this area than any of its competitors
1955 Attempting to monopolize and monopolizing
the linen service industry in various southern
states.
The grand jury charged in the indictment that
National had excluded competitors in the
linen service business in the South by buying
out hundreds of competing linen service
concerns, and had threatened to force out of
business existing competitors and concerns
desiring to engage in the linen service
business. According to the indictment,
National had prevented and suppressed
competition by conducting price wars;
lowering prices in areas where National had
competitors until competition was eliminated;
offering customers service at below cost or
free; and giving customers rebates and other
inducements not to deal with competing linen
service concerns. The indictment also charged
that National had circulated defamatory or
misleading reports among customers to
induce them to refrain from patronizing
competing linen service concerns. It was
further charged that, in selected areas,
National had induced or compelled linen
service concerns to enter into agreements with
it eliminating competition.
1958
A federal grand jury in New York City, on
February 21, 1958, indicted the Radio
Corporation of America on charges of
violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. RCA had been one of the
nation's leading electronic firms since its
incorporation in 1919. The four-count
indictment charged that RCA conspired to
restrain the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of radio purpose apparatus and
the licensing of radio purpose patents; and
that it conspired to monopolize, attempted to
monopolize, and monopolized the licensing of
radio purpose patents in the United States.
Radio purpose patents were defined in the
indictment to include patents relating not only
to radio and television receiving and

UC

A consent judgment
was entered against
the defendants in
related civil case. At
the same time the
court permitted
defendants in the
criminal case, to
change their pleas
from not guilty to
nolo contendere and
imposed fines of
$10,000 on the
corporation and
$4,000 on each of the
three individual
defendants

CC

Plea of nolo
contendere by Radio
Corporation of
America. A fine of
$25,000 on each of
the four counts in the
indictment was
imposed.
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American Natural
Gas Co.
Three natural gas
companies and three
corporate officials

1958

broadcasting apparatus, but also to such vital
electronic devices as-radar, sonar, and various
instruments used in guided missiles. Named
as co-conspirators in the indictment were
more than 25 of the leading electronic
manufacturers in the world. The indictment
charged that RCA agreed with, General
Electric, Westinghouse, and American
Telephone & Telegraph that those companies
would not compete with RCA in the domestic
licensing of radio purpose patents. RCA was
also charged with agreeing with leading
foreign electronic manufacturers not to
compete in patent licensing, nor to export
radio purpose apparatus into each other's
home territory. It was further charged that
RCA's foreign patents were made available
for licensing by foreign co-conspirators
through patent pools and exclusive agents
under conditions which restricted American
foreign trade. As a result of these
agreements, it was alleged that RCA had been
able to control the licensing of domestic radio
purpose patents originating not only with
itself but with the other leading domestic and
foreign companies in the electronic field. The
indictment charged that with control over
more than 10,000 patents in the radio purpose
field, RCA was placed in a position to compel
every domestic manufacturer in that field to
take licenses u:nder one or more of its major
package licenses.
Count one of the indictment charged that the
defendants, commencing in or about 1954,
had engaged in a combination and conspiracy
to monopolize interstate trade and commerce
in the transmission and sale of natural gas in
the States of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and parts
of Illinois and Michigan. Count two charged
them with a combination and conspiracy
unreasonably to restrain that trade, while
counts three and four alleged that the
defendants had attempted to monopolize and
had monopolized it. Under the terms of the
conspiracy as set out in the indictment, the
defendants and the co-conspirators agreed to:

CC

Each of the defendant
companies was fined
the following
amounts on pleas of
nolo contendere:
Count I, $35,000;
Count II, $30,000;
Counts III and IV
(merged), $35,000.
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Harte-Hanks
1958
Newspapers, Inc.
Three companies
and three individuals
engaged in the
operation and
publication of the
Herald-Banner
newspaper in
Greenville, Texas

(a) maintain free from com- petition
respective service areas in Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Michigan, and Illinois within
which the defendants American, Northern,
and Peoples shall operate; (b) exclude
Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. as a
competitor in the interstate transportation and
sale of natural gas in said states; (c) boycott
and refuse to purchase natural gas from
Midwestern; (cl) attempt to obstruct and
prevent Midwestern from obtaining natural
gas from Canadian sources; (e) contract to
supply natural gas to unserved communities
for the purpose of absorbing markets which
would otherwise be available for a potential
competitor; and (f) cooperate closely and
coordinate their activities for the purpose of
preventing the interstate transportation and
sale of natural gas in said states by any new
competitor.
The indictment alleged that, prior to October
1956, there had been published and
distributed in the Greenville area two
newspapers, The Morning Herald and The
Greenville Banner. These two newspapers
were the only significant sources of local
news, advertising, and other information
disseminated regularly for the residents of the
Greenville area through the publication and
circulation of newspapers, according to the
indictment. The indictment charged that the
defendants, who had controlled and operated
the Banner since 1954, conspired to eliminate
the competition of the Herald, and in fact did
do so. The indictment charged that the
defendants conspired to, and did eliminate the
competition of the Herald by: intentionally
operating the Banner at a loss, utilizing
revenues from other Harte-Hanks newspapers
to finance such losses; lowering subscription
rates for home and mail delivery of the
Banner; distributing copies of the Banner free
of charge; reducing the display and classified
advertising rates of the Banner; increasing the
Banner's advertising staff and the number of
pages published; endeavoring to purchase and

UC

On January 21, 1959,
the United States
District Court for the
Northern District of
Texas, Dallas
Division, ruled that
the defendants did
not violate the
antitrust laws.
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Jas. H. Matthews &
Co.
Vice-President of
company

1958

True Temper Corp.
5 corporations and 6
individuals

1958

purchasing the Herald; and seeking to curtail
credit resources available to the Herald.
The company was the nation's largest
manufacturer of bronze grave markers
allegedly controlling at least 75 percent of
industry sales. The indictment charged the
defendants with achieving and maintaining a
monopolistic position in the industry by
conspiring with its cemetery customers to
restrain trade in the sale and distribution of
bronze grave markers. According to the
indictment, the company had suggested, and
the cemeteries had adopted, certain restrictive
devices designed to prevent the installation of
any bronze grave marker not purchased from
the particular cemetery where the marker was
to be installed. In return for this assistance in
eliminating their bronze marker sales
competition, the cemeteries were said to have
agreed to purchase their own marker supplies
predominantly from the company.
According to that indictment and companion
civil complaint, True Temper Corporation
was the leading manufacturer of steel shafts
for golf clubs, producing approximately 90%
of all such steel shafts made in this country
and selling them for more than $5,000,000
per year. The other corporate defend- ants
were the "big four" manufacturers of golf
clubs, selling about 80% of all golf clubs in
this country for nearly $25,000,000 per year.
It was charged in the indictment and
companion civil complaint that True Temper
Corporation and the "big four" golf club
manufacturers violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act by engaging in a combination and
conspiracy to restrain and to monopolize
interstate trade in steel golf shafts and golf
clubs. Pursuant to that alleged combination
and conspiracy: (1) The "big four"
manufacturers allegedly fixed so-called
lowdown prices for golf clubs; (2) True
Temper Corporation allegedly communicated
those prices to other golf club manufacturers
who purchased True Temper steel shafts, and

UC

CC

The United States
District Court for the
Western District of
Pennsylvania
accepted the
defendants' pleas of
nolo contendere. The
Court imposed a fine
of $10,000 on each of
the four counts in the
indictment against
Jas. H. Matthews &
Co., and a fine of
$2,500 on each of
two counts was
imposed on N. Neilan
Williams, with
sentence suspended
on the other two
counts.
All of the defendants
in the criminal action
(No. 1400) pleaded
nolo contendere. True
Temper Corp. and
Wilson Athletic
Goods Mfg. Co., Inc.
were fined $10,000
each; A. G. Spalding
& Bros., Inc. and
MacGregor Sport
Products Inc. were
fined $5,000 each;
Hillerich & Bradsey
Co. was fined $2,000;
and the six individual
defendants were
fined $200 each
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Greater Blouse,
Skirt & Neckwear
Contractors Assn.
Three associations, a
labor union, and five
individuals

1959

Philadelphia Assn.
of Linen Suppliers
Trade association of
linen suppliers, 10
corporations, and 9
individuals

1959

Irving Bitz
Eleven individuals
and one corporation

1959

it allegedly refused to supply its steel shafts to
golf club manufacturers who failed to adhere
to those fixed prices; (3) the "big four"
manufacturers allegedly refused to purchase
steel shafts from competitors of True Temper
Corporation and purchased all of their steel
shafts requirements from True Temper
Corporation; (4) True Temper Corporation
allegedly granted to the "big four"
manufacturers preferential prices, discounts,
and allowances on steel shafts; and (5) True
Temper Corporation's top grade steel shafts
allegedly had to be used in those types of golf
clubs only which were sold to "pro shops"
and not to ordinary retail outlets.
The indictment charged that the defendants
since 1949 had conspired to (1) fix the prices
jobbers and manufacturers of blouses pay to
blouse contractors for the fabrication of
blouses, (2) allocate the blouse contracting
work of members of National among the
members of Greater and Slate Belt, and (3)
require members of National to give all their
blouse contracting work to members of
Greater and Slate Belt.
The indictment charged that since the year
1950, the defendants engaged in a conspiracy
to suppress competition in furnishing linen
supplies to customers in Pennsylvania,
southern New Jersey, and Delaware. The
terms of the alleged conspiracy included
refraining from competing for customers;
fixing prices for furnishing linen supplies;
submitting rigged bids for furnishing linen
supplies to public agencies, institutions, and
hospitals; and impeding other linen suppliers
who were not members of the conspiracy in
order to exclude such other linen suppliers
from the industry or compel them to join the
conspiracy.
According to the indictment, Suburban
Wholesalers Assn., Inc. (which consisted of
twelve wholesale distributors of newspapers
and magazines who operated in specified
areas in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut) acted as bargaining agent for its

CC

On April 13, 1964,
the court granted the
government's motion
to dismiss the
indictment as to all
defendants

CC

Fines, totaling
$170,500, were
imposed on pleas of
nolo contendere

CC

Prison sentences
imposed (including
on Hobbs Act claims)
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members in negotiating- labor contracts with
the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of
New York and Vicinity. The Union, it was
alleged, supplied these distributors with all
employees engaged in the handling and
delivery of newspapers and magazines, and
by provisions in labor contracts between the
Union and publishers, such publishers could
use as wholesalers only such distributors as
were themselves under labor contractual
relation with the Union. Count Two of the
indictment charged all of the defendants
except Lospinuso and Walsh with an
"unlawful combination and conspiracy to
monopolize for defendants Irving Bitz,
Charles Gordon and Bi-County . . . interstate
trade and commerce in the wholesale
distribution and sale of news- papers and
magazines in the area comprising Nassau and
Suffolk Counties in the State of New York" in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
This count in the indictment alleged the same
substantial terms and the same means of
effectuation as alleged in Count One of the
indictment, but also charged that this offense
was effectuated "by acts of violence and
intimidation in 1958 to coerce publishers to
deal with defendants Irving Bitz, Charles
Gordon and Bi-County and to exclude
competitors from obtaining business from
such publishers."
Brunswick-Balke1959 Combination and conspiracy to restrain and to
Collender Co.
monopolize interstate com- merce in folding
Brunswick-Balkegymnasium bleachers, in violation of the
Collender Co.,
Sherman Antitrust Act. Pursuant to the
Chicago, Ill., and its
alleged combination and conspiracy, it was
production manager,
charged, the defendants agreed: (a) to allocate
Jack B. Shipman;
among themselves business in folding
Wayne Iron Works,
gymnasium bleachers; (b) to adopt uniform
Wayne, Pa., and its
base prices, terms, and conditions of sale for
executive vice
such bleachers; (c) to submit to prospective
president, Charles
purchasers bids calculated according to
M. Wetzel;
certain agreed upon formulae; and (d) to
Universal Bleacher
retain defendant Corray as a consultant, to
Co., Champaign, Ill.,
coordinate the activities of the defendant
and its president,
corporations. Thus, it was alleged,

CC

On June 20, 1960,
Brunswick-BalkeCollender Co.,
Wayne Iron Works,
and Universal
Bleacher Co. were
each fined $20,000,
and Fred Medart
Mfg. Co. and CrosbyMiller Corp. were
each fined $10,000.
Five of the individual
defendants were
fined a total of
$14,500. The court
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Donald E. Vance;
,Fred Medart
Manufacturing Co.,
St. Louis, Mo.;
Crosby-Miller
Corp., Berlin, Wis.,
and its president,
John C. Miller;
Safeway Steel
Products, Inc.,
Milwaukee, Wis.,
and its vice
president, James
Jay; and Fred H.
Corray,
Southeast Texas
Chapter, Natl.
Electrical
Contractors
Trade association of
electrical contractors, seven
corporations and
three individuals

General Motors

competition in sales of folding gymnasium
bleachers was artificially restricted, and prices
were fixed at arbitrary levels.

1960

1961

The defendants are charged with having
engaged in a conspiracy, under the terms of
which the defendant and co-conspirator
electrical contractors would allocate jobs
among themselves, and the conspiring
electrical contractors other than the one
selected to be low bidder on a job would
submit higher bids or would refrain from
submitting bids. The indictment also charges
that the Union (Local No. 716, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers), named as
a co-conspirator, would refuse to supply
union labor for, or supply only inferior or
incompetent labor on, any job obtained by a
contractor not a member of the conspiracy.
The indictment further charges that the
Association members agreed to limit the
amounts of work obtained through
competitive bidding in accordance with a
quota established by the Association, and to
use identical over- head percentages in
computing their bids.
General Motors Corporation was indicted by
a federal grand' jury in New York on charges
of using its vast economic power illegally to
monopolize the manufacture and sale of
railroad locomotives. Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy announced the return of
the indictment, which charged that General
Motors violated section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Two. substantial competitors

had previously
accepted their pleas
of nolo contendere.

CC

Nolle prossed

UC

On December 28,
1%4, the court
granted the
government's motion
to nolle prosequi the
case.
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Avdel, Inc
Four foreign firms
and five individuals

were driven from the market and General
Motors captured 84.l% of the locomotive
business, As a result, the indictment asserted
that "the purchasers of locomotives and the
public in general have been. deprived of the
benefits of competition". The indictment
listed at least 14 ways in which General
Motors assertedly misused its economic
power to force most of the nation's 40
railroads to buy locomotives. The indictment
pointed out that General Motors is the largest
manufacturing corporation in the United
States in terms of total sales and assets and is
probably the nation's largest shipper of
freight. As a result, the complaint asserted,
General Motors was able to vary its price and
rate of return in locomotive sales, make
investments in manufacturing facilities for
railroad locomotives, and establish production
capacity in a manner which no competitor
could meet. This power, the indictment
asserted, was "unlawfully acquired and
maintained." Among the ways in which
General Motors did so, the indictment said,
included: Routing rail shipments to favor
purchasers of General Motors locomotives
and withholding or reducing shipments from
lines which purchased locomotives from
General Motors' competitors. Building plants,
warehouses and storage areas near lines of
railroads for the purpose of persuading the
railroads to purchase General Motors locomotives. Obtaining steel from General Motors
suppliers on terms which were substantially
more advantageous than those available to its
competitors. Financing the sale or lease of
locomotives on terms its competitors could
not match. Participating in the for ulation of
locomotive specifications for use in obtaining
competitor bids which prevented other
manufacturers from com- peting. Selling
locomotives at a loss in segments of the
market where it had competition.
1961
The two-count indictment asserted that the
firm and its international affiliates have
suppressed competition, fixed, prices,

CC

The court found the
companies guilty of
conspiring to
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were listed as coconspirators but not
as defendants.

allocated bids and monopolized sales in the
market for quick release pins

American Optical
1961
Co.
Victor D. Kniss, its
executive vice
president; -Bausch
& Lomb, Inc.,
Rochester, N. Y. and
Alton K. Marsters, a
vice president, also
of Rochester.
Charles Pfizer & Co. 1961
Three of the nation's
largest
manufacturers of
antibiotic “wonder"
drugs and three of
their top executives
Victor D. Kniss
executive vice
president of the
American Optical
Co., a corporation,
and trustee of theAmerican ' Optical
Co., a voluntary

1961

The two largest eyeglass manufacturers in the
country were charged with trying to pressure
independent competitors out of business and
with price-fixing

CC

The indictment charged that beginning in
November, 1953, Pfizer and American
Cyanamid conspired to maintain noncompetitive prices on broad spectrum
antibiotics. After Tetracycline was developed,
those two firms and Bristol conspired to
control patents on it and make prices for
Tetracycline conform to the non-competitive
prices maintained for the other drugs
Previously, both of the officers were named
as defendants in an indictment charging their
companies with violating Sections l and 2 of
the Sherman Act by conspiring to pressure
independent competitors out of business and
with fixing prices for ophthalmic lenses

CC

suppress and
eliminate competition
in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution
of quick-release pins
in violation of
Section 1 of the
Sherman Act (Count
1). Each of the
defendants was fined
$50,000. It found the
companies not guilty
as to Count 2, which
charged a
combination and
conspiracy to
monopolize trade in
violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act
Following nolo
contendere pleas,
fines totaling
$126,000 were
imposed

All defendants
acquitted following
Supreme Court
decision

CC
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association under
the laws of
Massachusetts, and
Alton K. Marsters,
vice presidentof
Bausch & Lotnb,
Inc.
\Minnesota Mining
and Mfg. Co
Indictment named as
co-conspirators and
not defendants, nine
other corporations in
connection with the
sale and
manufacture of
pressure sensitive
tape
Huck Mfg. Co.
Nation's two
principal
manufacturers of
lock-bolts-metal
fasteners used in
virtually every
American airplane
M. Klahr, Inc.
Two officers of the
firm and one union
official
Greater New York
Roll Bakers Assn.
Fourteen firms,
seventeen
individuals, and
three trade
associations on c
Johns-Manville
Corp.
Two companies and
five of their officials

1961

The grand jury charged that 3M abused patent
privileges by compelling or attempting to
compel its competitors to accept patent
license agreements. The agreements would
enable Minnesota to dictate to the industry
what prices could be charged, what products
could be made and how they could be made
and sold

CC

The district court
accepted a plea of
nolo contendere, and
imposed fines of
$50,000 on each of
three counts, and
$20,000 on each of
two counts, totaling
$190,000

1961

Conspiring to expand legal patent privileges
into an illegal monopoly and to fix prices.

CC

1962

Price fixing, bid rigging, monopolization in
the venetian blind business

CC

1962

Conspiracy to fix prices and monopolize in
kosher meat industry

CC

On December 6,
1965, the district
court ruling that the
manufacturer's
practices did not
violate the Sherman
Act (1690) was
affirmed by the U. S.
Supreme Court.
Defendants were
fined and given
suspended prison
sentences
Jury found
defendants not guilty

1962

Conspiring to restrain and monopolize, and
attempting to monopolize, trade in asbestoscement and pipe and couplings. he indictment
charged that the defendants and coconspirators con- i spired to (1) fix prices and
terms of sale, (2) restrain and eliminate
competition between the corporate defendants
in manufacturing and selling, (3) restrain and

CC

Defendants acquitted
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H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. The Great
Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Company, Inc

United Fruit Co.

eliminate competition with and among the
corporate defendants' distributors, (4) restrain
and eliminate the importation, distribution,
sale, and use of foreign-made products in the
United States, and (5) maintain a dominant
position in domestic production and sale in
the United States
1963
H. P. Hood & Sons of Boston, the largest
milk wholesaler in New England, was
indicted on charges of trying to drive out of
business milk dealers who sell MILK at
cheaper prices in glass jugs. charged Hood
with illegally cutting prices in selected areas,
often below cost, in order to destroy
competition from "jug handlers." Mr.
Kennedy said the indictment further charged
that Hood conspired with the Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Company, Inc. to restrain
competition and to monopolize the Greater
Boston milk market. Approximately
350,000,000 quarts of milk, worth about
$70,000,000 are sold there annually. The
indictment said Hood paid secret rebates to
A&P for milk sold in its Boston area stores.
Jug handlers process, sell and distribute milk
in gallon and half-gallon jugs, a cheaper form
of packaging than the milk cartons used by
Hood and other dairies.
1963
The United Fruit Company was indicted in
Los Angeles on charges of unlawfully
monopolizing the banana market in seven
western states'. '" Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy said the antitrust indictment also
charged United with trying unlawfully to
drive out budding competition by flooding the
market and by predatory pricing. The
defendants maintained substantially higher
prices in the western states than in markets
where they faced competition, the indictment
said. They also were charged with strictly
limiting banana imports in order to shelter the
western market from oversupplies which
might have brought down prices. This count
said the defendants refused to sell to a number
of wholesalers and allocated bananas in such
a way that customers had to buy excessive

UC

Jury found
defendants H. P.
Hood and The Great
Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. not guilty of
the charges.

UC

On October 23, 1963,
the following fines
were imposed on
nolo contendere
pleas: United Fruit,
$2,000; United Fruit
Sales Corp., $1,000;
Joseph H. Roddy,
$500; and Marion E.
Wynne, $500.
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American Oil Co.
8 major oil
companies

1965

Union Camp Corp.
Two manufacturers
of paper bags, and
two officials of one
of the firms

1967

amounts during periods of oversupply in
order to increase their allotments during
periods of short supply. Starting in July,
1960, two other banana companies-the
Standard Fruit and Steamship Company and
Ecuadorian Fruit Import Corporation-joined
to import bananas into Los Angeles by ship.
The other two counts charged the defendants
with conspiring and attempting to eliminate
this competition. They did so, the grand jury
charged, by: -Increasing their imports, in
order to flood the area with an oversupply of
bananas; -Maintaining maximum inventories
with customers to forestall purchases from
Standard-EFIC; -Deliberately reducing
wholesale prices, starting July 9, 1960 in
order to keep Standard-EFIC from making
any profit; and -Causing the Port of Los
Angeles to deny Standard-EFIC a pier
assignment for its banana cargoes.
Fixing the prices of gasoline in Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and Delaware
Conspiring to exclude competitors through
use of an allegedly invalid patent. The
charges related to patents for a paper bag with
a mesh-covered "window" to permit contents
such as potatoes and onions to be seen and
ventilated. According to the indictment,
Union was issued a product patent in 1947,
and in 1950 initiated a licensing arrangement
with selected competitors through which it
collected $50,000 in royalties annually and
exerted major control of the industry. Bemis
acquired a patent in 1953 covering the
apparatus which produced such bags, and
later transferred all licensing rights under the
patent to Union. The government charged that
both firms were aware the Bemis patent was
invalid. Through use of the invalid Bemis
patent, Union, according to the indictment,
then extended its power to collect royalties
and to block additional competition another
six years after its own patent expired in 1964.
The government said Union and Bemis used

CC

UC

Defendants pleaded
nolo contendere and
paid $50,000 each in
fines.
The two officials
were permitted to
plead nolo
contendere to the
conspiracy charge,
and the government
declined to prosecute
them on the
monopoly charge.
Bemis was allowed to
plead nolo
contendere to the
conspiracy count
over the government's objection.
(Unio Camp moved
to change its guilty
plea to nolo
contendere, the
government objecting
and the court taking
the matter under
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the invalid patent to force a manufacturer of
window-front bag attachment machinery to
restrict sales to Union licensees.

N. V. Nederlandsche 1968
Combinatie
11 drug companies
and 8 executives
Dunham Concrete
1969
Products, Inc.,
Three Louisiana
industrial concrete
suppliers, their
principal
management
official, and the
busi- ness agent of a
local union

International conspiracy to monopolize sales
and fix prices of quinine and quinidine.

CC

Charges of criminally conspiring to
monopolize trade in concrete products and of
extortion. Since early in 1966; the indictment
charged, the defendants and unnamed coconspirators violated the restraint of trade and
antimonopoly provisions of the Sherman Act
by coercing industrial purchasers of concrete
products to deal exclusively with the Dunham
companies through strikes, work stoppages,
and property damage at construction sites.
The indictment also charged that the
defendants conspired to obstruct and delay
construction projects which used competitors'
concrete products, to supply truckdrivers and
equipment operators to concrete suppliers at
higher wage rates and upon less favorable
terms than those extended to Dunham
companies, and to fix prices and prescribe
areas of sale of concrete products.

CC

advisement.) On May
6, 1968, Union Camp
was permitted to
enter a plea of nolo
contendere.' On the
same date fines
totaling $135,000
were imposed as
follows: Union
Camp, on the
conspiracy count,
$50,000 and on the
monopoly count,
$25,000; Bemis,
$50,000; Mr. Calder
and Mr. Bauer,
$5,000 each.
Nolo contedere pleas
and fines of $40,000
or $50,000 for the
corporate defendants
The jury convicted
the defendants of
attempting to
monopolize trade in
concrete products and
violating the labor
racketeering
provisions of the
Hobbs Act through
strikes, work
stoppages and
physical violence.
The defendants were
acquitted of a charge
of conspiring to
eliminate
competition, and the
jury was unable to
reach a verdict as to a
conspiracy to
monopolize count
and another Hobbs
Act count involving
activities at another
construction site.
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Air Conditioning
and Refrigeration
Wholesalers
Trade association
and two of its
officers

1970

The indictment charged the trade association
and the officers with conspiring with
members of ARW and the six manufacturers,
who were named as co-conspirators but not as
defendants, to monopolize and restrain trade
in the sale of refrigerant gas since at least
1953, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the

CC

The court imposed
fines of $30,000 each
on Dunham Concrete
Products Co. and
Louisiana Ready-Mix
Co. and a fine of
$40,000 on
Anderson-Dunham,
Inc. for Sherman Act
violations. Ted F.
Dunham, Jr., also for
Sherman Act
violations, was fined
$30,000 and
sentenced to 6
months in prison.
Fines and a prison
sentence were also
imposed for Hobbs
Act violations. On
March 22, 1973, the
U. S. Court of
Appeals in New
Orleans dismissed
appeals of Louisiana
Ready-Mix Co. and
Dunham Concrete
Products, who had
not prosecuted their
appeals, and affirmed
the convictions of
Anderson- Dunham,
Inc. and Ted F.
Dunham, Jr. On
September 26, 1974,
the U. S. Court of
Appeals in New
Orleans reaffirmed
the convictions.
Fines were imposed
pursuant to
acceptance of pleas
of nolo contendere,
as follows: the
association, $50,000
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General Motors
Corp. and Ford
Motor Co.

Sherman Act. Assistant Attorney General
Richard W. McLaren, head of the Antitrust
Division, said the defendants were charged
with excluding business concerns other than
air conditioning and refrigeration wholesalers
from competing with ARW's members in the
sale of refrigerant gas for replacement
purposes and restraining competition in the
sale of the gas. The indictment also alleged
that ARW members agreed to boycott
refrigerant gas manufacturers who sold to
business concerns other than air conditioning
and refrigeration wholesalers and who refused
to adhere to limitations on the shipment of
such gas.
1972 Conspiring to eliminate price concessions and
otherwise restrict competition in the sale or
lease of automobiles to the fleet market.

Empire Gas Corp.
Two individuals

1972

Morgan Drive
Away, Inc.

1973

A federal grand jury indicted Empire Gas
Corp. of Lebanon, Missouri-one of the largest
liquified petroleum gas distributors in the
United States and two individuals on charges
of violating the antitrust laws and conspiring
to violate federal firearms law in connection
with an unsuccessful attempt to dynamite a
tank truck belonging to a competitor
Monopolizing the business of transporting
mobile homes in violation of the Sherman

the two individuals,
$10,000 each.

CC

UC

CC

On December 13,
1973, the court
acquitted defendants
of the conspiracy to
monopolize count in
the criminal action.
On December 19,
1973, the jury
acquitted defendants
of the restraint of
trade count in the
criminal action. On
January 11, 1974, the
court supplemented
its bench opinion of
December 13, 1973,
that acquitted
defendants of the
conspiracy to
monopolize count in
the criminal action
Jury acquitted
defendants

Following nolo
contedere pleas, the
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Three leading
transporters of
mobile homes and
six individuals

Allan Molasky
Missouri magazine
wholesaler and its
two principal offers

1973

Braniff Airways,
Inc. and Texas
International
Airlines

1975

Act. The defendants have combined and
conspired to restrain, have combined and
conspired to monopolize, and have
monopolized, the business of transporting
mobile homes within the United States.
According to the indictment, the substantial
terms of the conspiracy have been to exclude
other persons from the business of
transporting mobile homes, to limit the
growth of competitors, and to coerce
competitors to join a rate making conference.
The suit also charged the defendants
conspired to raise their rates to levels charged
by the defendants, and to fix and stabilize
rates for transporting mobile homes within
individual states, without authorization of
state law.
Attempting to monopolize the wholesale
distribution of magazines and paperback
books in the Gulf Coast area. Defendants
attempted to monopolize by trying to acquire
almost all of the local wholesale agencies
located in the area between Victoria, Texas
and Pensacola, Florida. In addition, the
indictment charges the defendants induced
wholesalers to sell their businesses, by
threatening to put them out of business or
otherwise to injure them economically.

Conspiring to monopolize airline business
among three major Texas cities. The
indictment charged that Braniff and Texas
International attempted to deter, delay, and
increase the cost of Southwest's entry as a
competitor; exchanged information, schedules
and fares to maximize competitive pressures
brought to bear on Southwest; and jointly
undertook a boycott of Southwest by
preventing passengers scheduled for their

UC

CC

following fines were
imposed for each
count, to run
concurrently: Morgan
Drive Away and
National Trailer,
$50,000 each; Transit
Homes, $25,000;
Messrs. Miller and
DeMaras, $15,000
each; Mr. Privitt,
$7,500; Messrs.
Thompson and Thee,
$5,000 each, all
payment suspended
as to Mr. Thee; and
Mr.Hobson, $2,500.
Defendants entered
pleas of nolo
contendere over the
objections of the
government. On
February 12, 1975,
the court accepted
Allan Molasky's plea
of nolo contendere.
On Mar.ch 11, 1975,
each of the
defendants was fined
$50,000. A sentence
of 1 year, with 11
months suspended,
plus 2 years'
probation was
imposed on Mark
Molasky
Case dismissed, new
indictment entered in
1977 (see below)
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Lynn B. Hirshom

1976

Braniff Airways,
Inc. and Texas
International Airlines, Inc

1977

cancelled flights from switching to Southwest
flights.
A federal grand jury indicted a retired
national sales manager for Bethlehem Steel
Corporation on charges of violating antitrust
laws in connection with the sale of
reinforcing steel bars in Texas. The
indictment charged Lynn B. Hirshorn,
Bethlehem's former National Manager of
Sales, Reinforcing Bars, Piling and
Construction Specialties Products, with
conspiracy to restrain and monopolize Texas
reinforcing steel bar sales in violation of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
indictment charges that Mr. Hirshorn
combined and conspired with his coconspirators from 1969 to at least June 30,
1971, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, to: raise and stabilize prices of
reinforcing steel bars; require independent
fabricators in the Houston and Dallas areas to
limit their bid submissions for the supply of
re-bar materials to construction projects
requiring no more than a specified tonnage of
steel bars; and allocate certain construction
contracts among themselves in accordance
with their respective shares of the market for
re-bar materials in the State of Texas
The indictment charged that the two
companies conspired to restrain and
monopolize the airline business between
Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio
by actions aimed at impairing the ability of
Southwest Airlines, Inc., to serve the three
cities

CC

Jury returned verdict
of not guilty

CC

On June 14, 1978,
Texas International
was fined $100,000
on a plea of nolo
contendere. On
December 27, 1978,
Braniff was fined
$100,000 on a plea of
nolo contendere.
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